















Nearly all farm business ventures involve financial risk.  In some instances, private and
public tools used to manage financial risks in agriculture may influence farmers’ produc-
tion decisions.  These decisions, in turn, can influence environmental quality.  This bulletin
summarizes research and provides some perspective on private and public attempts to cope
with financial risks and their unintended environmental consequences.  Specifically, it
examines the conceptual underpinnings of risk-related research, challenges involved with
measuring the consequences of risk for agricultural production decisions, government pro-
grams that influence the risk and return of farm businesses, and how production decisions
influence both the environment and the risk and average returns to farming.
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Summary
Prices and yields of most agricultural commodities vary markedly across space and
time in unpredictable ways.  Farmers must cope with these and other financial risks,
sometimes with the assistance of government programs designed, in part, to mitigate
these risks.  How do these risks and the government programs designed to mitigate
them influence what crops farmers choose to produce, amounts they produce, and their
production practices?  How do farmers’ production decisions, in turn, influence envi-
ronmental quality?  
Volumes of basic and applied research address these questions. These volumes encom-
pass many different views of risk and apply many different models.  Multiple models
are used to address the same empirical phenomena and policy questions, sometimes
without the acknowledgement of alternative views.  Even fewer articles describe
testable hypotheses that might distinguish the empirical relevance of one model as
compared to others, which makes it difficult to gain a perspective on all views.
Risk often influences farmers’ production incentives, even when the costs of risk-cop-
ing are small.  In other instances, when risk-coping costs are large, risk affects produc-
tion incentives in entirely different ways; it may even influence the structure and orga-
nization of whole agricultural sectors.  This report introduces and reviews the concepts
and findings from the disparate literature on risk, government agricultural programs,
and their impact on the environment.
The report also provides a roadmap to the different ways risk influences production
decisions in agriculture.  It describes the market mechanisms that might theoretically
exist to provide risk-coping tools for farmers, the reasons why such risk-coping tools
may not exist, and the extent to which government programs may alleviate the costs of
risk coping.  It also describes applied research that examines the links between risk
and the production decisions farmers make, how different agricultural production prac-
tices influence the risk and returns of farming, and how different production practices
influence environmental quality.
After considering many views on the links between risk, government programs, and
their impact on the environment, as well as methodological challenges involved with
assessing these links, we draw six conclusions.  These conclusions are meant to clarify
key difficulties involved with research in this area so that future research can work to
overcome them.  Briefly, we find:
(1) Many studies emphasize farmers’ attitudes toward risk (or “risk aversion”) when 
analyzing farmers production decisions.  However, risk can affect farm produc-
tion decisions through many other channels.  For example, greater uncertainty 
about rainfall may alter a farmer’s fertilizer applications, regardless of his or her 
attitude toward risk.
(2) In some cases, the effects of risk on production can appear similar regardless of 
the channel through which they arise.  Because policy implications may be dif-
ferent depending on which channel gives rise to the effects observed, it is impor-
tant to evaluate the relative importance of the different channels.Economic Research Service/USDA Risk, Government Programs, and the Environment/TB-1908  v
(3) Risk is difficult to measure, and the effects of risk are easily confounded by the 
effects of factors that have nothing to do with risk.  Empirical estimates regarding 
the effects of risk will be more precise if they carefully account for these factors. 
(4) Our understanding of the effects of risk would benefit from an improved under-
standing of how key environmental factors (such as location, climate, and soil) 
affect land use.  These factors are among those most likely to confound the 
effects of risk in empirical studies, and are central to understanding the effects
of agricultural production on environmental quality. 
(5) Many economic models linking production to risk are static in nature. These
models overlook important longrun risks, which are more difficult for farmers to 
insure against than shortrun risks.  Longrun risks are central to key production 
decisions, including capital investment, technology adoption, crop rotations, and 
tree plantings.
(6) Economic models of behavior contain many basic assumptions about the way 
people make decisions in the face of uncertainty, but experimental research deriv-
ing from psychology casts doubt on some of these basic assumptions.  The practi-
cal relevance of these findings for farmers’ production decisions remains poorly 
understood and is an open area for future research. Financial Risks in Agriculture
Farming, like many entrepreneurial ventures, has many
financial risks.  Prices for corn, soybeans, beef, pork,
and most other commodities, as well as the inputs used
to produce these commodities, can vary widely and in
unpredictable ways both during and between seasons.
Crop yields on non-irrigated land can be more variable
and uncertain than prices.  
Uncertain prices and yields are the principal financial
risks in agriculture, but there are other risks too.  Other
important risks pertain to variability and uncertainty in
the quality of agricultural commodities, uncertainty
about the productivity of new seed varieties and tech-
nologies, and, increasingly, uncertainty about future
governmental actions, such as the size of future direct
payments or new environmental regulations.
How well do farmers cope with these risks?  How do
these risks influence the crops and livestock that farm-
ers choose to produce, the amount they produce, and
the inputs and agricultural production practices they
use?  How do these input and production practice
choices, in turn, affect environmental quality?  For
over 30 years, economists have studied these questions
from many different perspectives, both theoretically
and empirically.  Yet, despite a plethora of research,
few sharp conclusions emanate from it.  Indeed,
whether or not risk is of any practical importance at all
appears to remain a contentious issue (Just and Pope).
Despite the still-ambiguous consequences of risk,
concern about risk and farmers’ ability to efficiently
cope with it has served as an important backdrop for
government agricultural support programs.  These
programs, a mainstay of U.S. agriculture since the
Great Depression, have mainly taken the form of
price supports and supply control programs.  In
recent years, government programs that directly tar-
get risk have been expanded to include counter-cycli-
cal payments and newly increased subsidies on yield
and revenue insurance.  In addition, congressionally
approved ad hoc disaster assistance serves to com-
pensate farmers for extreme local weather events that
damage or destroy crops.  All of these programs
transfer wealth to certain farmers from the rest of the
economy and reduce specific risks associated with
some farm operations.
These policies give rise to questions about how well
private markets might function to provide risk-coping
tools to farmers in the absence of government policies
and to what extent government programs actually alle-
viate the costs of coping with risk.
New questions have emerged about the magnitude of
unintended environmental consequences that may stem
both from risk and from government programs.
Agricultural production inputs and byproducts, such as
pesticides, nutrients, and livestock waste, may cause
environmental problems if managed improperly.  For
example, farmers may overapply pesticides and fertil-
izer inputs in order to smooth profit flows, which, in
turn, may contribute to water quality degradation of
streams and lakes.  With such a scenario, government
programs that insure farm income may have the added
benefit of reducing excess applications of environmen-
tally damaging inputs.  On the other hand, subsidized
crop insurance may encourage farmers to plant crops
on fragile lands, which could harm the environment. 
Risk also lies at the heart of some theories that charac-
terize the organization and size of farms, which, in
turn, may have new environmental consequences.  For
example, recent trends in the livestock industry indi-
cate growing numbers of farmers are signing contracts
with processors rather than producing their product
independently and selling via spot markets.  This
increase in contracting has been associated with an
Economic Research Service/USDA Risk, Government Programs, and the Environment/TB-1908  1
Risk, Government Programs,
and the Environment
Introductionincrease in the size and concentration of livestock
farms. As livestock farms become larger and more
geographically concentrated, local land areas are
unable to absorb all the nutrient waste, creating poten-
tial environmental problems.  If risk management
underlies a driving force behind this structural change,
then a better understanding of it will help researchers
and policymakers understand the associated environ-
mental problems. Thus, understanding the link
between risk and structure as well as the links between
structure and the environment can help to inform agri-
cultural and environmental policy.
Objective
This report presents an overview of the interactions
between public and private risk management strategies
and environmental resources.  The report first
describes how individual incentives are shaped both by
risk and by government programs that possess risk-
mitigating properties. Risk can influence production
decisions in many ways.  Researchers have illustrated
these different influences using different modeling
approaches.  Since different approaches often are used
to describe the same phenomena, this report provides a
description of all approaches in a single place to help
researchers gain perspective on the many ways risk
can influence production decisions.
In Chapter 2, we define risk as it is usually understood
within economic analysis, explain how markets can
trade and thereby share risks, and then review two
general ways that risk can influence choices in an ide-
alized world of perfect markets.  In Chapter 3, we
explain why markets are not perfect and review three
additional approaches for modeling risk in imperfect
markets.  Each approach is presented using the sim-
plest possible example—the goal is not to spell out
every implication of every approach, but to illustrate
the economic tradeoffs underlying each one, so the
reader can see how the diverse views of risk differ.
Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion about why risk
research appears to lack harmony.
Government programs can influence agricultural risk
and returns, and they may directly or indirectly influ-
ence the environment.  We present a brief overview of
the relevant agricultural programs in Chapter 4.  Then,
in Chapter 5, we characterize the different kinds of
production alternatives available to farmers, individu-
ally and collectively, and explain how these alterna-
tives may influence risk, returns, and the environment.
In Chapter 6, we discuss the complicated interaction of
risk, government programs, and the environment, and
provide six conclusions that we feel future research
should bear in mind.
2  Risk, Government Programs, and the Environment/TB-1908 Economic Research Service/USDAThis chapter defines risk as it is usually modeled and
understood within the agricultural economics literature
and explains how perfect markets could, in theory,
take risk into account.  These concepts, which provide
the building blocks researchers use to analyze risks,
are important for understanding how risk-management
policies influence farmers’ decisions. 
The primary financial risks farmers face involve vari-
ations in yields and prices.  For example, on a typical
corn, wheat, or soybean field in the United States, the
coefficient of variation (for definition of terms in
bold, see glossary at end of each chapter) of year-to-
year yields is about 0.3 (Makki and Somwaru).  This
means that the average field will post a yield of more
than 30 percent above or below the historical trend
curve, approximately one-third of the time.  The coef-
ficient of variation of year-to-year price changes is
over 0.2 for most commodities.  Because farmers’
profits, on average, are only a small share of their
total revenues, the large variability of both prices and
yields implies that, in any single year, a farmer’s prof-
it may vary widely for reasons beyond his or her
immediate control.  Holding all other factors the
same, these numbers imply that revenue for the aver-
age “lucky” field and year (those with above-average
yields in years with above-average prices) is well over
twice that of the average “unlucky” field and year
(those with below-average yields in years with below-
average prices).
Risk Versus Uncertainty
Most economists do not draw a sharp distinction
between risk and uncertainty.  Usually both terms refer
to situations in which economic variables vary ran-
domly according to probability distribution functions
that are known to decisionmakers.  Some draw the dis-
tinction that risk refers to instances in which probabili-
ty distribution functions are known and uncertainty
refers to instances in which probability distribution
functions are unknown (Knight).  This distinction
holds particular relevance in empirical analyses, in
which researchers almost never know the true proba-
bility distributions.  In economic modeling of risk,
however, economists usually make the assumption that
economic agents hold beliefs that are consistent with a
known probability distribution function.  This view is
generally referred to as the Bayesian or Subjectivist
view of probability, and it is the view adopted for most
of this report.
The Bayesian view of probability contrasts with the
Frequentist view of probability, which holds that prob-
abilities equal the relative frequencies from repeated
experimental trials as the number of trials tends toward
Economic Research Service/USDA Risk, Government Programs, and the Environment/TB-1908  3
Assumptions that Imply Perfect Markets
1. Symmetric information  Economic agents (individuals, firms, community groups, government) 
have the same set of information about all aspects of production, exchange, and distribution activi-
ties, including market opportunities, available technologies, costs of production under alternative pro-
duction arrangements, the quality of goods produced, and the intentions of other agents.
2. Large numbers of buyers and sellers A large number of buyers and sellers of all kinds of goods 
and services prevents individual buyers or sellers from influencing prices.
3. Free entry and exit Economic agents can freely enter and withdraw from markets. 
4. Profit maximization Economic agents are motivated purely by profit and/or utility maximization 
and are cognitively capable of making decisions perfectly to achieve these objectives, subject to bud-
get constraints. 
5. No externalities Actions taken by one economic agent do not directly influence costs or utility of 
other agents (except via prices).
Chapter 2–Risk in Perfectly Functioning Marketsinfinity.  Because it is impossible to perform an infi-
nite number of experimental trials, to a Frequentist,
the true probability distribution function is simply
unknowable, which corresponds to the notion of
uncertainty as distinct from risk. Except where explic-
itly stated otherwise, we assume in this report that
probabilities are known to the decisionmakers and we
use the words risk and uncertainty interchangeably.
Perfect Markets
Theory implies that, when markets function perfectly,
there is no particular reason why risks should be a
major policy concern in agriculture.  Perfect markets
do not, however, imply perfect certainty.  The assump-
tions that underlie the perfect-markets condition are
still strong and, interpreted literally, unrealistic.
Despite their lack of realism, the assumptions that
underlie this condition provide a useful starting point
from which to construct more realistic models.  One
may then reconsider (or test empirically) each assump-
tion and hopefully move on toward more realistic
models and assumptions, which should lead to a deep-
er understanding of agricultural production and the
implications of agricultural policy.
The perfect-market condition implies that competitive
prices and wages exist for all goods and services in all
possible contingencies (potential “states of the
world”).  For example, taken literally, the perfect-mar-
kets condition implies that separate and competitive
markets exist for a bushel of corn delivered August 30,
2002, contingent on when rainfall in Cowley County,
Kansas, is both an inch above normal and an inch
below normal in a given month, holding all other con-
ditions the same.  Accordingly, many refer to a perfect
market as one with “complete contingent claims.”  To
satisfy the perfect-market condition literally, one must
imagine an infinite number of separate contingent mar-
kets just for corn delivered on August 30, 2002.  There
would also be an infinite number of markets for corn
delivered on August 31, and another infinite number
for each and every other good and service (or potential
good and service) that might be delivered at every
moment into the infinite future. 
Although a perfect-markets assumption is implausible,
only slightly less implausible is the observation that
tradable securities, insurance, and futures markets
effectively constitute contingent claims to deal with
the largest risks faced by individuals.  Furthermore,
contingent claims might be combined in ways to track
other risks that are not explicitly traded.  For example,
a farmer cannot actually sell a bushel of corn in June
for delivery in August contingent on a month’s rainfall
in Cowley County, Kansas; but he might use a futures
market to sell a bushel of corn in June for uncondition-
al delivery in August and purchase yield insurance for
his crop.  Taken together, these claims might well
approximate a contingent market for corn deliveries.
Risk Sharing
Trade in contingent claims effectively allows individu-
als to share all risks regarding wealth, health, and the
weather.  If people are averse to risk, then sharing
risks reduces the risk that any individual must live
with, and thereby increases the welfare of all those
pooling their risks.  In this way, the gains from risk
sharing are much like the economic reasoning that
more generally underlies gains from trade.  In perfect
markets, when all risks are shared, individual risks are
averaged across everyone in the population—unlucky
outcomes are averaged with lucky outcomes, reducing
total risk.  Therefore, weather in Cowley County,
Kansas, would not be of particular concern.  What
matters is the aggregate outcome, the cumulative sum
of all risks stemming from the weather and otherwise.
Farmers would find it beneficial to pool their risks not
only with other farmers but also with individuals in
other sectors of the economy.  Thus, despite the large
price and yield risks with which farmers must contend,
if these risks are uncorrelated with national income
then, in principle, they are completely insurable under
perfect markets.
To measure the potential insurability of agricultural
risks, one can examine the relationship between farm
income and national income.  Figure 1 shows the
growth rate for real net farm income from 1950 to
2000 overlaid with the growth rate of real gross
domestic product (GDP) over the same period.  As 
one might expect, farm income varies far more than
national income; however, the two series are positively
correlated.  It is not readily apparent to the naked eye,
but these two series have a positive and (narrowly) sta-
tistically significant correlation equal to 0.302—they
tend to move up and down together, but just slightly.
Because national farm income averages away most of
the income risk faced by individual farmers, even
nationwide net farm income grossly underestimates the
risk faced by a typical farm operation.  Under perfect
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and all other individuals in the economy would be
concerned only with the variability in GDP, which is a
small fraction of nationwide farm income and only the
tiniest fraction of the income variability experienced
by an uninsured (or non-risk-sharing) farm operation.
In a nutshell, farm income risk is of no concern to
farmers, if markets are perfect.
Decisions under Uncertainty
in Perfect Markets
Price and yield uncertainty can influence agricultural
production decisions even when markets are perfect.
The perfect markets assumption implies that only the
best possible decisions will in fact be made and that
farmers’ individual tolerances for risk are of no rele-
vance to those decisions.  However, perfect markets do
not imply that decisions in the face of uncertain prices
and yields are equivalent to decisions that would be
made if prices and yields were certain values fixed at
the average level observed in the real world, or if they
were variable but known with certainty in advance.
The effects of uncertainty on production decisions
result from the physical irreversibility of some deci-
sions and the fact that some decisions must be made
before the decisionmaker knows the outcome of a ran-
dom event.  In other words, these kinds of effects have
to do with how the flow or level of information inter-
acts with the timing of decisions. 
A Two-Period Example
Many of the ways in which risk can influence deci-
sions under perfect markets can be illustrated using a
simple two-period model of profit maximization.  In
the first period, farmers make production decisions
given their beliefs about the possible outcomes of ran-
dom events beyond their control (such as the weather).
To illustrate, let π(x,s) denote profits as a function of a
farmer’s production decisions (the vector x) and
exogenous random factors (the vector s).  In perfect
markets, farmers are completely insured against uncer-
tain variability in profit itself; so their rational objec-
tive is to maximize the expected value of π given their
beliefs about s, which are summarized by a probability
distribution function.  The value of the farming opera-
tion (denoted V) is given by
The relevance of uncertainty (the randomness of s) to
decisions depends on the shape of the profit function.
Consider the neoclassical profit function for a compet-
itive firm where x = [L (labor), K (capital)], s = [p
(output price), w (wage), r (rental price of capital)],
and the production function q(L,K) transforms labor
and capital inputs into a single output q:
Note that, in this example, all prices are uncertain and,
because the firm is competitive, prices enter the profit
function linearly.  One can write the value of the firm
as
Decisions in this uncertain environment are, therefore,
equivalent to an environment wherein prices are fixed
at the expected values of the random prices.  In gener-
al, if one can write the profit function as π(x,s) = sa +
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1This objective is not correct unless returns to farming are uncor-
related with returns of the aggregate economy.  A slightly positive
correlation is evidenced between net farm income and GDP, so
farm income risk will have a small influence on production choic-
es even in perfect markets. Asset pricing is concerned primarily
with the measures of aggregate risk and the covariance of trad-
able investments such as stocks and bonds (and agricultural pro-
duction decisions) with the aggregate. This report focuses mainly
on the implications of individual farm risks, which are mostly
uncorrelated with the aggregate.  (See Cochrane for modern
review of asset pricing.)
π(,) ( ) . x x u u =− − pq L,K wL rKsbg(x), where sa and sb together comprise s and g(x) is
an arbitrary production function (profit is a linear
function with respect to s), then decisions in certain
and uncertain worlds will be equivalent in this way.
This result follows from the fact that, in this special
case, E[π] =E[sa] + E[sb] g(x), so that optimal deci-
sions about x depend only on the expectation of s.
This equivalence between choices in certain and
uncertain worlds is a special case that crucially
depends on three assumptions: (1) perfect markets (or
complete risk sharing), (2) all uncertainties enter the
objective linearly, and (3) a two-period world wherein
all decisions must be made in the first period.2 If any
one of these three assumptions is altered, this equiva-
lence no longer holds.  The rest of this chapter discuss-
es relaxation of assumptions (2) and (3)—the instances
where risk matters to decisions even when markets are
perfect.  The next chapter discusses the implications of
imperfect risk sharing.
Nonlinear Risks
Statistics suggest that yield uncertainty could be as
large as, or even larger than, price uncertainty.  Unlike
price risks, farmers also might control the degree of
uncertainty associated with yields, often in nonlinear
ways.  For example, irrigation might push up yields at
the bottom of the distribution more  than those at the
top (see figure 2).  A linear effect, by contrast, would
influence all possible yield levels by the same
amount, either additively or proportionately. This non-
linearity negates the above equivalence results for
uncertain prices.
The nonlinearity of yield uncertainty in response to
certain inputs follows from the nature of plant growth.
Justus von Liebig’s Law of the Minimum states that
yield is proportional to the amount of the most limiting
plant growth factor, whichever it may be (van der
Ploeg).  Because the most limiting factor is often sup-
plied by the weather (such as rainwater, sunlight, or an
absence of hail or pests), human provision of addition-
al inputs results in higher yields only when those
inputs turn out to be the most limiting factor.  Thus,
irrigation increases yields greatly during years with lit-
tle rainfall but increases them much less in years with
heavy rainfall.
The role of risk in perfect markets also hinges on the
timing of decisions relative to the resolution of uncer-
tainties.  Returning to the irrigation example, if irriga-
tion decisions can be made after observing the rainfall
and moisture content of the soil, then the optimal
amount can be applied in all states of the world.  In this
context, more risk really implies more variability in the
marginal value of irrigation applications (and in the
amount applied).  On the other hand, if the investment
decision or application amount must be made prior to
observing rainfall and moisture content of the soil, then
risk affects production in an entirely different way.
Another example is that farmers may sometimes apply
surplus nutrients, such as fertilizer and phosphorus, to
their crops (Babcock).  When plant growth is limited
by a factor other than nutrient applications, the excess
can build up in the soil and ultimately increase nutrient
runoff into streams and lakes, a potentially serious
environmental problem.
Why would farmers apply costly surplus nutrient
applications if such applications do not result in higher
yields?  A straightforward explanation involves the
way uncertainty about required nutrient applications
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completely and costlessly reversible.
Yield without irrigation




Irrigation affects yield risk in a nonlinear wayenters into the profit function nonlinearly. Pre-existing
nutrient levels in the ground are unknown to the
farmer and vary spatially across a field.  Weather con-
ditions may also preclude mid-season re-entry into the
field to adjust nutrient applications as needed.  Thus, a
farmer must apply nutrients before knowing how much
will be needed to maximize plant growth via von
Liebig’s Law of the Minimum.
One can demonstrate the effects of these uncertainties
using the two-period model wherein x =[n (nutrient
applications)] and s = [n (the uncertain level of n that
maximizes plant growth)], and m is the price of nutri-
ent applications. Profits are characterized by
where revenues,
The exogenous scalar m (not random)
denotes the price of nutrient applications.  The associ-
ated perfect-markets value function is
V= max E[R] – mn
where
The function F(.) denotes the probability distribution
function (or cumulative density function) of
Inspection of this profit function makes clear that
uncertainty about n is central to the decision about n—
it is incorrect to substitute the expected value of n for
the random variable.
The first-order condition of the optimization problem
implies that the economically optimal level of nutrient
applications (n*) solves the equation
Without further assumptions about the distribution
function F(.) one cannot solve explicitly for n*.  It is
possible, depending on the distribution function and
the ratio m/r, that n* is either greater than or less than
the expected level of n.  Unless uncertainty about n is
arbitrarily small, however, an economically optimal
application of nutrients may often induce an agronomi-
cally excessive application level.  This contrasts with
applications in a certain world in which no excess
nutrients would be applied.  The expected level of
excess nutrients is equal to the probability that (n ( <
n*) multiplied by the expected value of (n* - n) given
that (n < n*).  Mathematically, expected excess nutri-
ents are equal to 
Thus, uncertainty about the level of nutrients required
for optimal plant growth influences the level of nutri-
ent applications, the level of excess nutrients applied
on average, and indirectly, the environmental quality
of streams and lakes.3
In general, uncertainty that enters into the objective in
a nonlinear fashion will be an important determinant
of agricultural production decisions.  Except for price
uncertainty faced by competitive firms, nonlinear
risks are likely to be the rule rather than the exception
in agriculture.  And when firms are not competitive
(that is, they have market power or control over the
prices they receive) price uncertainty also may be
important.4 The existence of market power, however,
violates the perfect-markets condition, which is the
focus of this chapter.
Dynamic Decisions under Uncertainty
Even when markets are perfect and uncertainty enters
the profit function linearly, risks will often influence
decisions in dynamic environments.  Unlike the two-
period model presented above, many decisions in the
real world have implications over the long run.
Furthermore, people possess a certain amount of flexi-
bility about the timing of these decisions.  For farmers,
these longrun decisions include decisions about when
to plant a new orchard or replace an old one, whether
to alter a previously planned crop rotation in light of
changing commodity crop prices, and when to buy a
new tractor, combine, or irrigation system. 
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3Note that if farmers pay nothing for damages associated with
excess nutrient applications, then those damages constitute a neg-
ative externality, which violates the assumptions that underlie
perfect markets.
4 When a producer holds some market power, it is not precisely
correct to refer to “price uncertainty,” as if it is exogenous.  In
such a context, prices are jointly determined by the producer’s
decisions and by random events beyond his or her control (for
example, demand uncertainty).
=− + (( ) ) ( ) 1 Fn r n Fnr n n < n. E[]Three elements, central to relevance of risk to these
kinds of decisions, cannot be embodied within the
two-period model above.  These three key elements
are: (1) the irreversibility or partial irreversibility of
the decision, such that it entails longrun consequences,
(2) the decisionmaker’s ability to control both the tim-
ing and nature of the decision, and (3) when uncertain-
ty becomes resolved over time, it holds the implica-
tions that persist into the future.
We can illustrate all of these features using a slightly
more complicated three-period example.  In the first
period, a farmer may choose to buy a tractor or to wait
until period two to make the purchase decision.  If he
buys the tractor in period one, it will increase his out-
put in periods two and three.  If he decides to buy the
tractor in period two, it will increase output only in
period three.  Profits depend on whether or not the
farmer buys a tractor and the price of the crop, which
is uncertain.  The price of the crop in periods two and
three will not be learned until period two (p2 = p3).  So
the farmer can make a more informed decision if he
waits until period two to make it; however, by waiting
until period two, he will miss out on the second peri-
od’s increased output that would have been provided
had he purchased the tractor in period one.  For this
example, suppose that it is worthwhile to buy the trac-
tor if prices turn out to be high but not worthwhile to
buy the tractor if prices are low.
Should the farmer wait in the first period?  The answer
depends on the odds of high versus low prices and
how much profit is affected by both the price level and
the tractor purchase decision.  There are four possible
profit levels.  Suppose that these are 0 and +1 for low
and high prices without a new tractor, and –1 and +2
with a new tractor.  In this case it is optimal to wait if
the probability of a high price is less than 2/3.  If the
farmer did not have the option of waiting until period
two—that is, the farmer were forced to make his deci-
sion in the first period—then he buys the tractor if the
probability of a high price is greater than 50 percent.
Note that this example, illustrated in figure 3, possess-
es each of the above three elements.  First, the tractor
is assumed to be an irreversible decision.  If, after the
second period, the farmer could return the tractor for a
full refund in the event that prices turned out low, then
risk would have no bearing in this model—the deci-
sion would be based on the probability of 1/2, not 2/3.
Second, the farmer has control over the timing of his
decision.  If the farmer were for some reason forced to
make his purchase decision in the first period, the
same equivalence between the certain and uncertain
models described above for the two-period linear
model would occur.  Third, whether prices turn out
high or low in the second period, the random outcome
persists into the third period.  If the uncertainty were
transitory rather than persistent (it had no bearing on
the price in period three), then whatever the farmer
learns about the price in the second period, he learns
too late to make any use of it; once again, the choice
would be based on the probability of 1/2, not 2/3.
For this three-period example, the lower the probabili-
ty of high prices, the more likely it is optimal for the
farmer to wait until period two to make his decision.
In more general problems, the greater the level of
uncertainty about the profitability of irreversible deci-
sions, the more likely the farmer is to wait.  The intu-
ition is that the greater the level of uncertainty, the
greater the amount of information the farmer will
obtain by waiting to make his decision.  Because
information is always valuable, a greater flow of it
over time is more likely to forestall decisionmaking,
all else the same.
Beyond this simple model, how relevant is dynamic
uncertainty to agricultural decisionmaking?  Some
basic features of modern agriculture suggest that it is
very important for many decisions.  In thinking about
the relevance of dynamic uncertainty to a particular
decision, one should pose three questions about each of
the three crucial elements of the above model: (1) How
long-lived or irreversible is the decision? (2) How
much latitude does the decisionmaker possess regard-
ing the timing of his or her decision? (3) How much
information transpires over time, and for how long
does the relevance of information persist into the
future?
Many basic decisions in agriculture possess all three
elements.  Decisions regarding capital investment and
technology choices are partially if not totally irre-
versible.  Farmers may be able to sell purchased
machinery and equipment but are not likely to procure
the full price. There also are transaction costs associat-
ed with salvaging machinery.  Other kinds of invest-
ments, such as drip irrigation systems that entail large
installation costs or educational expenses to learn how
to implement new technologies, may be totally irre-
versible (Marra and Carlson).
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of pests to which crops are susceptible depend on what
crops were planted in prior rotations, even year-to-year
planting decisions entail a certain amount of irre-
versibility.  For example, switching from a corn-soy-
bean rotation to a corn-soybean-soybean rotation
involves certain irreversibilities beyond the nominal
machinery and human capital investments that may be
required for such a change.  To the authors’ knowl-
edge, there has been no formal supply-response analy-
sis of field-crop rotations in light of dynamic price
uncertainty and past irreversible planting decisions.
Such an analysis might help to explain why supply
elasticities for corn, soybeans, and wheat are seeming-
ly so inelastic.  “Waiting” in this context, implies a
tendency to forestall altering a crop rotation in light of
changing prices.  Given large enough uncertainty
about future prices, it may take large price swings
before farmers are finally induced into switching from
previously planned crops. 
Irreversibility is clearly important for tree crop plant-
ings and removals.  Trees have a long production life,
removal is irreversible, and new plantings require
several years of growth before they reach full pro-
ductive capacity.  Replacing a current stand with a
new stand (and perhaps a new variety) therefore
entails large irreversible costs. 
Although farmers have full discretion with regard to
the timing of most decisions, the third element, the
persistence of new information, is more relevant for
some kinds of risks than for others.  The stochastic
properties of commodity prices imply that they are
random walks or near random walks.  (A pure random
walk implies that the best guess for next year’s price
is the current price.)  In other words, shocks to com-
modity prices persist very long into the future.  Quite
the opposite from prices, yield shocks are highly tran-
sitory in nature—yield in one season usually provides
little or no information about the level of the next sea-
son’s yield.  Yield variation is due mainly to the
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Figure 3
Sequential decisions under uncertainty
Payoff =(Period  Period)
                 Two,   Threeweather, and this year’s weather provides little infor-
mation about next year’s weather.  Thus, price risks
are typically important to dynamic decisions under
uncertainty, and yield risks are relatively unimportant,
so long as markets function perfectly.5
The next chapter examines how risk influences deci-
sions in imperfect markets.  In imperfect markets, tran-
sitory yield risk can influence decisions in ways differ-
ent from perfect markets. This difference between
yield uncertainty and price uncertainty can be useful in
analyses that attempt to sort out the empirical rele-
vance of the different ways risk affects agricultural
production. We return to this point in Chapter 3, which
includes a brief discussion of empirical strategies.
To analyze dynamic decisions under uncertainty
requires the use of dynamic programming.  The intu-
ition of dynamic programming, illustrated in the sim-
ple three-period example above, utilizes the logic of
backward induction. As the name suggests, these
problems must be solved in reverse chronology,
through all possible contingencies in all future periods.
For more realistic problems, the dynamic program
requires use of a computer to solve.  These models
also can be econometrically calibrated with economic
data (Rust).  For certain time-continuous problems one
can derive analytical solutions using stochastic calcu-
lus (Dixit and Pindyck).  Review of these particular
methods is beyond the scope of this report.
Conclusion
When markets function perfectly, individuals can share
their individual risk so that the only risk individuals
intrinsically care about is aggregate risk.  However,
even when markets are perfect, risk is still important
to many kinds of agricultural production decisions.
The relevance of risk in this context has to do with the
timing of information as compared to the timing of
decisions.  Within a two-period framework, risks that
enter into the objective in a nonlinear fashion influ-
ence choices because they must be made without
knowledge of certain key variables, such as in the
nutrient example.  Price uncertainty, however, does not
influence decisions in this two-period context because
uncertain prices enter into the objective function lin-
early—choices are equivalent to those that would be
made if prices were fixed at their expected level.  Risk
is also important in dynamic environments when farm-
ers have control over the timing of their decisions.  In
dynamic environments, farmers must balance the cost
of waiting to make a decision against the potential
gains that stem from the new information that they
might collect.
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5Note that in the beginning of Chapter 1 we quantified yield risk
using deviations from a trend curve and quantified price risk
using year-to-year changes.  We quantified yield and price risks in
these ways because yield shocks are mostly transitory whereas
price shocks are mostly permanent.For Further Reading
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Glossary
backward induction A method for deriving optimal behavior by working sequentially backward in 
time through all possible contingencies.
coefficient of variation Measures the proportional variation of some data.  It is approximately equal to the
average proportional difference from the average.  Mathematically, it is equal to 
the standard deviation divided by the average.
perfect markets A condition that implies that competitive prices exist for all goods and services in 
all possible contingencies.  The assumptions that underlie the perfect markets con-
dition are summarized in the box on page 3.  In the context of risky environ-
ments, perfect markets are sometimes referred to as complete market of contin-
gent claims.
probability distribution A function usually denoted as F(x) that gives the probability that the realization of
function a random variable will take on a value less than or equal to x.  F(x) is always pos-
itive, weakly increasing in x, tends to zero as x tends to negative infinity, and 
tends to 1 as x tends to positive infinity.  It is sometimes referred to as the 
cumulative density function.
random walk A time-series stochastic process (yt) in which the current level of the series 
includes the sum of all past random shocks—the best guess for next period’s level
is the current level. Mathematically,  yt – yt-1 = et, where et is a random variable 
independent of all ei for all i not equal to t.Market Imperfections and Risk
Chapter 2 examined the ways in which risk influ-
ences agricultural production decisions when markets
are perfect.  Among other assumptions, perfect mar-
kets imply that a complete (or “as if” complete) set
of contingent claims exists to facilitate farmers’ shar-
ing their risks with all others in the economy.  In
such a world, the good or bad luck of each individual
is averaged with the good and bad luck of everyone
else, which leaves individual farmers to care only
about aggregate risk, not the risk of their particular
farm operation. In perfect markets, uncertainty faced
by an individual farm operation is relevant to farm-
level decisions only to the extent that it embodies a
certain lack of information.
This chapter focuses on different consequences stem-
ming from risk.  These consequences follow when
markets are imperfect, a complete market of contin-
gent claims does not exist, and individuals cannot
share all their risks.  Amid imperfect risk sharing,
farmers may in fact care about the income uncertainty
associated with their particular farm operation. For
example, in bad years they may be unable to consume
as much as they do in good years.  The disutility asso-
ciated with variable consumption, formally defined as
risk aversion, may cause farmers to alter their produc-
tion decisions to make farm income less risky and
variable.  Farmers may also diversify their income-
earning opportunities by working off the farm.
Imperfect markets can hinder farmers’ ability to obtain
funds to purchase or rent all the inputs required for
production.  A farmer’s good luck may, therefore,
bring unexpected cash flow and, with it, new prof-
itable farming opportunities.  On the other hand, bad
luck can force a farmer into bankruptcy or a forced
sale even when the ongoing farm operation is expected
to be profitable.  This result differs from perfect mar-
kets in which all individuals can exploit all profitable
opportunities.
Information-related effects of risk examined in
Chapter 2 remain relevant when markets are imperfect;
however, there has been little research to examine how
information-related effects interact with imperfect risk
sharing.  Recent theoretical research by Athey is a
notable exception.  This chapter focuses on the direct
effects of imperfect risk sharing.
Asymmetric Information
In reality, individuals and firms share many risks and
often finance production using contingent claims.
Individuals and firms often borrow, save, and fund
investments using financial markets.  But these mar-
kets probably do not constitute complete contingent
claims—individuals still bear considerable risk that
would be insurable in a perfect world. What prevents
market participants from trading risks via contingent
claims?  Why are not all risks shared?  
The foremost answer to this question put forth by
economists is asymmetric information.  The problem
is not that inherent uncertainties exist, but rather that
some individuals are better informed than others.
Akerlof’s seminal (and Nobel prize-winning) paper,
“A Market for Lemons,” put down in formal mathe-
matical language what almost anyone who has bought
a used car plainly understands: typically, one who sells
a used car knows more about its uncertain quality than
a potential buyer.  This fact helps to explain why a car
is usually worth less than the new purchase price the
moment after a buyer drives it off the dealer’s lot.
The logic underlying lemon markets is as follows.
Those who buy used cars rationally expect that the car
they purchase will be of average quality.  Those selling
cars of above-average quality are less willing to sell
because they can receive only an average-quality
price; so some potential sellers choose to keep the car.
Buyers rationally understand that those with high-qual-
ity used cars are less likely to sell, so the buyers are
willing to pay only a lower-than-average quality price.
As a result, sellers of even average-quality cars are
less willing to sell, because they cannot receive even
an average-quality price.  And so on…. Thus, used car
markets are thinner than they would be if car quality
were plainly observable—that is, if one could costless-
ly spot “a lemon.”
The general observation that some individuals are
better informed than others helps us to understand
why some markets, including those for certain con-
tingent claims, will not always exist.  And when they
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Chapter 3–Risk in Imperfect Marketsdo exist, they will differ from those predicted in per-
fect markets.
Individuals and firms work to overcome inefficiencies
caused by asymmetric information by writing con-
tracts, developing reputations for high-quality goods
and services, offering “money back guarantees,” and
so on.  These mechanisms constitute costly signals that
markets can use to credibly communicate information
from one party to another.  However, due to the costs
embedded in sending these signals, these mechanisms
will not work to share all risks.
The two main conceptual ideas used to better under-
stand asymmetric information environments are
adverse selection and moral hazard.6 The tension
underlying each of these ideas can be presented as an
optimal contract between informed and uninformed
parties, labeled respectively as the “agent” and the
“principal.” 
Adverse Selection
Adverse selection involves situations in which the
agents know something about their situations the prin-
cipals do not know, e.g., the used-car sellers in
Akerlof’s market for lemons.  From the perspective of
the principals, they would like to write different con-
tracts for different types of agents.  For example, some
agents may own riskier farms than others, and insur-
ance companies (the principals) would like to charge
different premiums for different risk classes. They can-
not do so because they cannot distinguish the riskier
classes from those that are less risky.  In some situa-
tions, the problem of adverse selection can be partially
overcome by offering menus of contracts to agents
who reveal their types through the contracts that they
select.  For example, insurance companies typically
will offer a menu of different premium-deductible
combinations to differentiate high-risk types from low-
risk types (Makki and Somwaru).  Indeed, according
to the revelation principle, an optimal insurance
scheme will always induce agents to reveal whether
they are low risk or high risk.  But, in some situations,
these markets simply will not exist—some risks are
uninsurable.
Moral Hazard
The problem of moral hazard involves situations in
which both parties know the probability distribution of
possible outcomes but in which the agents’ decisions
are not explicitly contractible.  For example, the physi-
cal and mental effort exerted by a laborer may not be
measurable in a way that can be explicitly defined in a
compensation contract.  In moral-hazard environments,
the principal and agent must write a second-best incen-
tive scheme based on some observable and verifiable
outcome(s), such as yields, prices, and/or profits.  The
observable outcome depends on the agent’s decision
(usually called “effort”) but also on luck.  Because the
agent’s compensation depends on luck in addition to
his decisions or effort, his income is not completely
insured.  Indeed, Robert Shiller regards moral hazard
as the chief reason why not all risks are shared: 
“Living standards are not fully insurable because of
moral-hazard problems: if people or organizations
knew that their income were guaranteed regardless
of the amount of effort that they put in, then there
would be a markedly reduced incentive to make
efforts to maintain income.”  (Shiller, p. 1)
Thus, moral hazard embodies a natural tension that
arises between insurance (risk sharing) and incentive
provision.
Adverse selection and moral hazard give compelling
reasons for why risks are not insured.  The focus of
this report, however, pertains to the consequences of
imperfect risk sharing for agricultural production
choices.  Are agricultural production decisions differ-
ent because farm income (or profit) risks are not fully
insured? If so, how are they different?
The answers to these questions depend on the model
used to answer them.  Below we review three broad
departures from perfect markets that are often used to
shed light on how imperfect risk sharing might influ-
ence agricultural production.  First, however, we
review economists’standard definition of risk aversion,
because it is often the cornerstone of these departures.
Risk Aversion
Since publication of seminal papers by Arrow and
Pratt, the notion of “risk aversion” to economists has
been synonymous with “diminishing marginal utility
of consumption.”  Because consumption is inextrica-
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6A third type, called hidden information, is closely related to
adverse selection, so we do not review it here. See Chapter 14 in
Mas-colell, Whinston, and Green for an explanation of this kind
of asymmetric information as well as more formal presentations
of adverse selection and moral hazard.bly tied to an individual’s wealth, under certain condi-
tions, it is also synonymous with “diminishing margin-
al utility of wealth.”  In other words, the richer one is,
the less one values an additional dollar.  And the more
risk averse one is, the more rapidly one’s marginal
utility declines with one’s level of consumption or
wealth.
Mathematically, if utility is defined as u(c), where c
represents consumption, risk aversion implies that
u”(c) < 0 (’and ” denote the first and second deriva-
tives, respectively).  If consumption is random with an
average value of c* then risk aversion (u”(c) < 0)
implies u(c*) > E[u(c)]: the utility of average con-
sumption is greater than the expected utility of con-
sumption.  The two measures of risk aversion, pio-
neered by Arrow and Pratt, are the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion (-u”(c)/u’(c)) and the coefficient
of relative risk aversion (-c u”(c)/u’(c)).  In accordance
with these two measures of risk aversion, there are two
commonly used utility functions in which these mea-
sures of risk aversion are the same, regardless of the
amount consumed.  Given a measure of risk aversion
r, these two utility functions are 
Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA):
u(c) = A – e – rc
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA):
u(c) = – Ac (1-r)/(1 – r) 
In both utility functions, larger r implies more risk
aversion—a larger difference between u(c*) and
E[u(c)] for the same probability distribution function
of c.
For dynamic models in which utility is additively sep-
arable over time, risk aversion also measures the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution.  Indeed, the con-
cepts of intertemporal substitution and risk aversion
are very similar: the first measures willingness to sub-
stitute consumption between one period of time and
another; the second measures willingness to substitute
between one “state of nature” and another.  In the first
case, the more inelastic the intertemporal substitution,
the more one prefers a smooth consumption profile
over one that grows or diminishes rapidly with time; in
the second case, the more risk averse one is, the less
one prefers more uncertain consumption over less
uncertain consumption. The two concepts are identical
if an individual’s overall utility (after the fact) through
a period of fluctuating consumption is the same,
whether or not the fluctuations in consumption were
anticipated before the fact.
Although diminishing marginal utility makes good
common sense, to some it may seem strangely discon-
nected from the notion of risk.  Indeed, there is grow-
ing skepticism in psychology and some areas of eco-
nomics about the fundamental (behavioral) equiva-
lence of risk aversion and diminishing marginal utility
(Kahneman and Tversky; Rabin, 2000).  This skepti-
cism stems in part from observed levels of risk aver-
sion, both experimentally and in market data, that are
so large as to defy rationalization via diminishing mar-
ginal utility (Mehra and Prescott; Rabin, 2000).
Furthermore, although the concepts of risk aversion
and intertemporal substitution are conceptually quite
similar, empirically they differ substantially (Weil).7
Aside from pushing economists to reconsider their
notion of risk aversion, these empirical findings imply
that even a modest amount of unshared agricultural
risk could be crucially important to many agricultural
production decisions.
No Risk Sharing
The most prevalent way to model the effect of imper-
fect risk sharing on agricultural production choices fol-
lows an influential paper on price uncertainty by
Sandmo that assumes no risk sharing at all.  This
approach assumes that farmers choose inputs to maxi-
mize a static, concave (risk-averse) function of profits,
like the utility function described in the last section
except that current profits are substituted in place of
consumption.  This objective appears similar to the
two-period objective presented in Chapter 2, except it
is the expected “utility” of profits that is maximized
rather than just expected profits.
Again denoting production decisions by the vector x
and exogenous random factors by the vector s, the
value of the farm operation is given by
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() VE u =m a x
x [] π() . x x, , s sBecause the utility function is itself a nonlinear func-
tion of profits, random factors will influence optimal
decisions even when they enter into the profit function
linearly.  Thus, the equivalence of production deci-
sions, whether or not prices are uncertain, no longer
holds as it did in Chapter 2.  All kinds of uncertainty
now matter for production decisions.
This optimization problem, the solution to which char-
acterizes the way risk influences production choices, is
somewhat more complicated than the two-period prob-
lem of Chapter 2.  We can characterize an approximate
solution to the general problem by taking a second-
order Taylor expansion around the average (or expect-
ed) level of profits.  Specifically, we can approximate
by
where VAR(π(x,s)) denotes the variance of profits.
Because risk aversion implies negative u”, production
decisions that increase profit variance, all else the
same, are underutilized in comparison to those in a
perfect-markets world; while those that decrease profit
variance, all else the same, are over-utilized in com-
parison to those in a perfect-markets world.
Production decisions that may influence the variance
of profits include the applications of specific inputs,
such as nitrogen and pesticides, as well as allocations
of acreage between crops.  Because crop returns will
not be perfectly correlated, an incentive to mitigate
risk through crop diversification is built into this
objective (Freund).
Although the no-risk-sharing approach may seem as
extreme and unrealistic as perfect markets, the no-risk-
sharing assumption is relatively simple analytically.  It
allows one to see how risk may influence farmers’
decisions when they can avail themselves of very few
risk-coping tools.  The problem with using such
extreme assumptions is that it attributes all nonlinearity
in the current-period objective to risk preferences.  In
reality, farmers’preferences may matter, but the nature
of the constraints that prevent them from sharing (or
insuring) all of their risks probably matters more.
One might, however, interpret the risk-aversion coeffi-
cients estimated within this paradigm loosely—not as
preferences per se, but as an amalgamation of prefer-
ences and constraints on risk sharing.  This interpreta-
tion, however, could be misleading, in part because
constraints may be more binding in some states of the
world than in others.  For example, a farmer with large
cash reserves and little debt may be better able to self-
insure against random income shocks than a farmer
with small cash reserves and large debts may.  The sta-
tic risk-averse objective cannot encapsulate these time-
varying constraints.
More important, however, there is no reason to believe
that the nature of the constraints will be such that they
can be approximated by a smooth, concave utility
function. This modeling approach thus obscures
important features of these constraints. Indeed, it is
possible that a risk-neutral or risk-averse individual
will appear to be risk-loving, given the asymmetric
information environment in which the person resides
(Ghatak and Pandey).  This point is explained in more
detail below in the discussion about contracting.
Despite these shortcomings of the no-risk-sharing
approach, its simplicity, as compared with other ways
of modeling the influence of risk, has inspired a large
literature that examines the effects of risk on agricul-
tural production decisions.  It has been applied to
interesting analyses of production scale, technology,
and crop allocation decisions (e.g., Just and Zilberman,
Just et al., Freund).  
Credit Constraints
In perfect markets, it is inconsequential whether capi-
tal investment is financed with retained earnings, equi-
ty, or debt, an important result first observed by
Modigliani and Miller.  One implication of asymmetric
information, however, is that it may preclude financing
of some profitable farming operations (Stiglitz and
Weiss, Jaffee and Russell, Jensen and Meckling). If
asymmetric information prevents farmers from obtain-
ing external funds to finance their operations, then
they may need to accumulate funds on their own via
savings or retained earnings, contrary to Modigliani
and Miller.  
Farm income risk holds new implications in this envi-
ronment.  Good luck, perhaps in the form of higher-
than-expected prices and/or yields, may provide a
farmer with resources to finance an operation for
which the farmer could not previously obtain funds.
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The Equity Premium Puzzle
Through the study of financial markets, researchers have learned that individual behavior toward risk is
complex and that it is probably different from that depicted in standard economic models. Perhaps most
noteworthy is the observation that over the last 100 years stocks have earned, on average, a premium of 6
to 8 percent greater than the returns of Treasury bills and other low-risk investments, a phenomenon nor-
mally explained by risk aversion.  The degree of risk aversion implied by this premium is very large, a
well-known observation in finance called the “equity premium puzzle” (Mehra and Prescott; Hansen and
Jagannathan; Rabin, 2000). 
The size of the stock-market premium is puzzling because aggregate consumption growth is relatively
smooth.  In other words, the fluctuations of the stock market have caused little variation in consumption,
so the only way the large risk premium and small consumption variability can be reconciled under the
standard notion of risk aversion is if people are extremely risk averse.  In fact, researchers have shown that
(regardless of assumptions about individual preferences) the stock market premium implies that the mar-
ginal value of a dollar varies by an average of 30 to 50 percent per year or more (Hansen and
Jagannathan). 
If a small but non-negligible portion of the population held a more modest degree of risk aversion (such
that they were willing to tolerate somewhat larger consumption variability in exchange for much greater
consumption growth), then the premium would be driven down via competition.  These individuals would
sell low-risk assets and buy stocks, ultimately pushing down the price of safe investments and bidding up
the price of stocks, thereby reducing the size of the premium.  Therefore, the equity premium puzzle not
only implies that some people are very risk averse, but that most people are very risk averse.
The equity premium puzzle becomes even more confounding when the level of risk aversion implied by it
is checked against the historical patterns of interest rates and consumption growth.  To understand this
alternative viewpoint, it is important to recognize that the concepts of risk aversion and intertemporal sub-
stitution are conceptually quite similar—the first measures willingness to substitute consumption between
one “state of nature” and another, and the second measures willingness to substitute consumption between
one period of time and another.  In standard economic models of consumption, these concepts amount to
the same thing: variation in marginal utility caused by consumption variation.  A high degree of risk aver-
sion therefore implies highly inelastic intertemporal substitution—people are very unwilling to substitute
consumption over time.
If individuals are unwilling to substitute consumption between one period of time and another, and con-
sumption is growing, then they would have a strong desire to shift future consumption toward the present.
The collective desire to shift future consumption to the present should drive interest rates up to levels
higher than actually observed.  This phenomenon has been termed the “risk free rate puzzle” (Weil).
Furthermore, as consumption growth fluctuates over business cycles, interest rates also should fluctuate
far more than they actually do.  
To resolve these and other puzzles, economic researchers are increasingly turning toward psychological
models of behavior. (See the section “An Addendum on Psychology-Based Models, p. 21”.)  In the future,
researchers may wish to investigate whether these empirical observations from finance are relevant to
farmers’ decisions in light of the financial risks they face.Bad luck, on the other hand, may cause a farmer to
scale back previously planned (though still profitable)
operations due to a new shortage of funds.  In an
extreme case, a farmer may be forced to sell or declare
bankruptcy, even when the ongoing farm operation is
expected to earn acceptable profits over the long run.
In short, the existence of credit constraints implies that
it sometimes takes wealth to make wealth.
The anatomy of credit-constrained capital investment
is depicted in figure 4 (also see Hubbard).  In perfect
markets, a firm chooses inputs to maximize expected
profits, which implies that the marginal value product
(MVP) of an input is set equal to the price of the input.
Thus, in perfect markets, the marginal value product of
capital (MVPK) should equal the interest rate (assum-
ing no capital depreciation).  This unconstrained level
of investment is depicted as I** in figure 4.  However,
if asymmetric information constrains farms from bor-
rowing investment funds or otherwise obtaining them
externally, then investment will be lower than in per-
fect markets.  One might imagine that the cost of capi-
tal to a farmer equals the real rate of interest so long as
the level of investment is less than the current net
worth (NW).  To borrow funds beyond NW becomes
more costly, as depicted by the upward sloping “con-
strained capital supply” curve.  Given a sufficiently
high level of investment demand or sufficiently low
NW, the constrained level of capital investment (I*)
will be less than the unconstrained level.
Because income or profit shocks influence NW, these
shocks also influence the constrained supply of invest-
ment funds and the level of investment.  The effect
from profit risk is quite different from those previously
discussed. In some circumstances, the effect may be
difficult to sort out empirically from other kinds of
effects.  For example, a shock to the price of an agri-
cultural commodity is likely to persist into the future
(see Chapter 2).  The price shock, therefore, shifts out
the supply of capital by increasing NW, but also shifts
out the demand for capital.  Any attempt to measure
the effect of the credit constraint requires careful con-
trol of investment demand.  Due to the effects of
dynamic uncertainty discussed in Chapter 2, control-
ling for investment demand can be difficult.
Sometimes credit constraints can restrain capital
investment (or other inputs) even without a shortfall in
wealth, if wealth is illiquid or otherwise costly to
quickly leverage in order to obtain funds precisely
when needed.  In this context, credit constraints are
sometimes called liquidity constraints.
Most of the research on credit constraints involves
empirical tests regarding their mere existence—
whether or not capital investment is sometimes fore-
stalled due to a shortfall of cash.  These findings have
been used to assess whether and how much business-
cycle fluctuations in the macro economy stem from
investment cycles that derive from liquidity constraints
(Hubbard).  Much of this research finds evidence of
liquidity constraints in manufacturing and other sectors
of the economy.  Additional research reports a certain
amount of skepticism regarding these empirical find-
ings, in part because of possible confounding of
investment demand and supply shocks noted above
(Gomes). A lot of research also examines the role of
credit constraints to agricultural production, consump-
tion, and poverty in developing countries (Bardhan
and Udry).
Several papers have tested for credit constraints in
U.S. agriculture (Bierlen and Featherstone, Hubbard
and Kashyap, Barry et al.); all of these papers report
evidence that these constraints are important. Farmers
also tend to save more than people with other kinds of
(presumably less risky) occupations and tend to hold a
disproportionate share of their assets in farmland and
farm capital (Carroll).  The Economic Research
Service (ERS) reports that U.S. farm households have
a higher average income than nonfarm households














The effect of credit constraints
Notes: NW is the internal net worth of the firm or individual; I* 
is the optimal (credit-constrained) investment; I** is unconstrained
investment; r is the real interest rate; MVP   is the marginal value
product of capital.
K ($61,947 vs.  $56,313 in 2000) and higher average net
worth than nonfarm households ($492,195 vs.
$272,083 in 1998), yet they consume less on average
than nonfarm households ($27,981 vs. $35,250 in
1998) and, therefore, save more.  ERS reports that, in
2001, 63 percent of farm households held half or more
of their wealth in farm business assets.  Farmers also
report that they use cash reserves as their primary
method of risk coping (Harwood et al.).  These facts
suggest that the role of self-finance, and therefore risk
in light of credit constraints, appears to be a key fea-
ture in agriculture.  Unlike the no-risk-sharing model,
the importance of risk is not driven by individual
tastes, such as risk aversion or diminishing marginal
utility of wealth.
The main focus of this report, however, is whether risk
(and in this case, whether risk in light of credit con-
straints) influences the nature of agricultural produc-
tion decisions in the United States.  We are especially
interested in decisions that pertain to environmental
quality.  To our knowledge there has been little
research that explicitly examines the role of credit con-
straints to decisions besides capital investment, nor
any empirical research that attempts to identify the
environmental consequences of these constraints (at
least outside of developing economies).8 These effects
could be more complicated than our simple presenta-
tion above.  Credit constraints may lead farmers not
only to reduce the quantity demanded of certain inputs
such as capital, but also to substitute other, less expen-
sive (and less efficient) inputs, and to manage already-
owned resources less efficiently than if they were not
credit constrained.  For example, credit-constrained
farmers might plant more high-value, but land-degrad-
ing, crops; or they might delay adoption of conserva-
tion practices in the short run in the hope of building
up financial resources to afford more efficient longrun
decisions in the future.  They might also be less
inclined or less able to adopt expensive irrigation or
precision technologies, which may influence environ-
mental quality.
Contracting Models
Because asymmetric information provides the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of both the no-risk-sharing and cred-
it-constrained approaches to modeling imperfect mar-
kets, perhaps the most theoretically pleasing approach
is to build the asymmetric-information environment
explicitly into the model.  This approach is the one
taken by the contracting literature (Hueth and
Hennessy).
This section illustrates the contracting approach and
describes the nature of the theoretically optimal con-
tract in moral hazard environments.  Recall that moral
hazard environments involve situations in which spe-
cific actions taken by an individual (such as a farmer
supplying labor and other inputs) cannot be contracted
explicitly by an outside interest (such as a landlord,
bank, or other financier).  Instead, an incentive con-
tract is written whereby the individual is compensated
based on some observable and verifiable outcome that
depends on both the individual’s supplied inputs and
random events outside the individual’s control—both
inputs and luck matter for output.  If the individual is
risk averse, then such an incentive contract is always
second best, because uncertainty in the individual’s
compensation causes “excessive” risk bearing which
must be shouldered in order to provide incentive for
the individual.9 If the contract paid a fixed wage, and
thereby protected the contractee from risk, then the
contractee would have no incentive to apply costly
inputs.  If the inputs themselves were contractible,
then the optimal action could be undertaken while pro-
viding full insurance to the individual (if the outside
party is risk-neutral). The problem involves a tension
between providing the right incentives versus provid-
ing income insurance.
The standard analytical setup typically is as follows.
A business venture earns stochastic profit π(x,s),
which depends upon a vector of inputs (x) applied and
the outcome of some random variables s.  For exam-
ple, x could index the on-farm costs for inputs and
labor and s the random events related to weather.
Suppose that another individual owns the business
venture and cannot explicitly contract the laborer’s
choice for x, and therefore must choose a compensa-
tion scheme for the laborer based on realized profits,
π(x,s).  The contract is defined by the function w(π)—
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8An exception by Roberts and Key examines the effect of credit
constraints on planting decisions.
9The word “excessive” is in quotes because some might disagree
with its use in this context—because in a world with asymmetric
information, the information-constrained optimum is the best
that one can do.  The term is used here only to highlight the
tradeoffs that must be made in the moral hazard environment
that are not present in a perfect-markets world with fully con-
tractible inputs.given realized profits π, the laborer gets w(π) and the
owner gets π – w(π).
The value of the contract to the principal (such as a
bank or financier) is defined by
subject to: E[ulab(w(π(x,s)))]≥ u (IR constraint)
and
(IC constraint)
The IR (individual rationality) constraint ensures that
the laborer’s expected utility under the contract is
greater than or equal to the laborer’s opportunity cost
(u, a lower bound for the laborer’s utility).  The IC
(incentive compatibility) constraint ensures that the
laborer’s effort is at an optimal level given the con-
tract w(π).
The solution to this contracting problem can be com-
plicated, even when both the vectors x and s contain
only one variable.  Even in this simple case, one can-
not be assured that the contract w(π) is monotonically
increasing or even continuous—in general it can be
highly nonlinear.
The ambiguous shape of the contract curve implies
that production decisions in asymmetric environments
can be influenced by risk in complicated ways.  In the
first model presented in Chapter 2, the farmer chose x
simply to maximize expected profits, E[π]; in the no-
risk-sharing model, this was generalized to maximiza-
tion of E[u(π)]; under the optimal contract, the objec-
tive is generalized further to maximization of
E[w(u(π))].
This report shows that it is nonlinearity of one form
or another that makes risk important to decisions.
Within a static (two-period) environment, there are
now three layers of nonlinearity that must be assessed
in order to trace out the influence of risk.  The first
layer entails nonlinear influence of uncertainty on
profits; the second layer entails individual preferences
(curvature of the utility function); and the third layer
entails nonlinearity in the incentive scheme (w()).
This third layer is by far the most complicated.  The
nature of the incentive scheme (its nonlinearity) is
itself determined by the nature of the uncertainty and
how decisions made by the farmer influence those
risks.  That is, the contract and risk are jointly depen-
dent on each other.  In the first two layers, at least the
objective was exogenous.  
Furthermore, the nature of nonlinearity in the contract
scheme is more ambiguous than in the other two lay-
ers.  Nonlinearity of the first layer is governed by fea-
tures of the production function about which natural
science may provide some insight, such as von
Liebig’s law of the minimum.  Nonlinearity in the sec-
ond layer is governed by reasonable assumptions about
individual preferences—that is, diminishing marginal
utility of consumption.  In the third layer, however,
small differences in the environment may lead to very
different contract shapes, which may be discontinuous
as well as nonlinear.  This means that risk could have
almost any conceivable influence on production choic-
es, depending on subtle features of the profit function
and the probability density function for s.
Finally, this problem differs from reality by its static
nature.  Compensation schemes will be complicated fur-
ther when they take into account the sequential flows of
information, input decisions, and profits (Antle).
The complexity of even the simplest asymmetric infor-
mation problems creates large empirical challenges.
Although the tensions posed by the moral hazard prob-
lem are representative of those in many production,
marketing, tenure, and debt contracts observed in agri-
culture, and though it seems clear that asymmetric
information in conjunction with risk will influence
agricultural production decisions, developing testable
hypotheses with regard to these effects is difficult.
Theory alone cannot predict whether imperfect mar-
kets increase or decrease input use of any particular




Ronald Coase’s 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm”
raised and answered a fundamental question: Why do
firms exist in a market economy?  In a world of per-
fect markets, all factors in the economy, including
material inputs, labor, and technologies, are priced and
traded in competitive exchange—all production deci-
sions are decentralized.  A firm, by contrast, is a cen-
20  Risk, Government Programs, and the Environment/TB-1908 Economic Research Service/USDA
xu
lab  =   arg max [ ( )))]
x Ew ( . π(x x, , s s
() VE w
x,w() = max ) [] π() ( x x, , s s x x, , s s −πtralized institution of decisionmaking in which many
intermediate factors are produced and freely provided
within it.  What determines the size and nature of
firms, these centralized decision-making units? 
Coase’s answer to these questions is transaction costs.
Transaction costs between individuals or firms are
those associated with finding goods and services and
negotiating prices for them. Transaction costs within
firms include costs of monitoring workers or otherwise
providing incentives that induce them to make choices
and exert efforts as instructed by their managers.
Coase hypothesized that the size and nature of firms is
determined by an optimization problem: the industry
structure we observe is the one that minimizes transac-
tion costs.  Since Coase, transaction costs have been
used to explain the structure and organization of all
kinds of social and political institutions (Williamson). 
One modern interpretation of transaction costs
involves the loss of efficiency embedded in the sec-
ond-best incentive schemes of asymmetric-information
environments.  These transaction costs are sometimes
called agency costs.  As a crude model, we might
imagine that, within a firm, workers earn fixed wages;
but the firm must employ costly tiers of managers to
monitor their work.  In other words, workers’ actions
(elements of the vector x in our modeling approaches)
are explicitly contracted, but at a cost.  Between firms,
prices serve as a second-best incentive scheme, as in
the moral hazard contract.  Firm size, industry size,
and organization evolve so as to minimize the sum of
these within-firm and between-firm transaction costs,
which include agency costs.  The moral hazard model
of the last section showed that an important kind of
agency cost depends on the amount of risk—the opti-
mal contract involves balancing a natural tension
between incentive provision and insurance.  Thus, the
greater the level of risk, the greater the agency costs,
all else the same.
The point is that because risk is central to agency costs,
an important kind of transaction cost, risk may also be
important for understanding the size and organizational
structure of farms.  And the structure of agriculture
may entail important environmental consequences.
Historically, farms have been among the most decen-
tralized production units in our economy.  Even today,
sole proprietorships and partnerships account for a
majority of U.S. farms and total agricultural produc-
tion value.10 For some commodities, however, this
structure is beginning to change.  Producers are
increasingly signing production and marketing con-
tracts with processors who often provide many of the
material inputs to production.  The institutional dis-
tinction between the farm and the processor is becom-
ing less clear.  
Furthermore, in some industries, the prevalence of
contracting has been associated with larger farm oper-
ations and a greater geographic concentration.  The
hog and broiler industries are striking examples of
these trends. A related environmental challenge
involves the management of nutrient waste originating
from the increasingly concentrated livestock industry.
Local cropland and pastureland cannot physically
assimilate the high concentration of this waste
(Gollehon et al.).
Theoretically, risk, structure, and environmental quali-
ty are related.  Empirically, structural change and envi-
ronmental quality are geographically correlated for
certain livestock industries. However, because there
are many kinds of transaction costs besides risk-related
agency costs, the causal link between risk, structure,
and the environment remains ambiguous.
An Addendum on 
Psychology-Based Models
Most of the research on agricultural risk is based on
expected utility theory (EUT). Expected utility theory
also provides the basis to substantiate economists’
notion that risk aversion is synonymous with diminish-
ing marginal utility of consumption.  Formally, it says
that preferences are linear in probabilities: the value V
an individual places on the probabilities P(s) over pos-
sible states of the world (s) that yield utility u(s) is
equal to V(P(s), u(s)) = ΣP(s)u(s).
The key assumption underlying EUT—the one with
the least obvious implications and the one that has
received the greatest amount of skepticism—is the
independence axiom.  The independence axiom is a
Economic Research Service/USDA Risk, Government Programs, and the Environment/TB-1908  21
10In 1997, sole proprietorships made up 86 percent of U.S. farm
households and produced 53 percent of U.S. farm product sales.
See the USDA-ERS briefing room on farm structure,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/FarmStructure/Questions/
Closeup.htmclose cousin of the transitivity assumption in standard,
certain-world utility theory. It says that a linear trans-
formation of a set of lotteries should not alter an indi-
vidual’s ranking of lotteries.  That is, if an individual
prefers lottery A to lottery B, then after probabilistical-
ly combining these two lotteries with a third lottery
(say, C), the individual should prefer the augmented
lottery A over the augmented lottery B.  For example,
the independence axiom implies that if A is preferred
to B, then (50 percent chance of A + 50 percent chance
of C) must be preferred to (50 percent chance of B +
50 percent chance of C).
To make the above example concrete, suppose lottery
A is $3,000 for sure, lottery B is an 80-percent chance
of $4,000 and a 20-percent chance of $0, and lottery C
is $0 for certain.  If one prefers lottery A to lottery B
(as most people do in experimental trials), then the
independence axiom implies that (25 percent chance of
A + 75 percent chance of C) should be preferred to (25
percent chance of B + 75 percent chance of C).  The
second two lotteries amount to (a 25-percent chance of
$3,000 plus a 75-percent chance of $0) and (a 20-per-
cent chance of $4,000 plus an 80-percent chance at
$0).  Contrary to the independence axiom, in experi-
ments most people prefer augmented lottery B over
augmented lottery A despite their preference of unaug-
mented lottery A to unaugmented lottery B (Kahneman
and Tversky).
This and other experimental anomalies have cast
broader doubt on all economists’ standard risk-model-
ing approaches.  Other notable anomalies include a
tendency by individuals to overweight small-probabili-
ty events, to be risk averse with respect to losses and
risk loving with respect to gains, regardless of wealth,
and to choose differently between substantively identi-
cal alternatives depending on how the alternatives are
“framed.” Although these anomalies have been well
known for many years, and many generalizations of
EUT have been developed in attempts to accommodate
experimental findings, little research applies these gen-
eralizations to observed agricultural production deci-
sions.  Applications in mainstream economics are just
beginning to gain wider acceptance and application.
Application of these experimental phenomena to
observed economic behavior remains a new frontier in
economic research.  Delayed application of non-expect-
ed utility theories has been slow to arise due to basic
questions that remain about how to interpret the experi-
mental findings for application to real economic behav-
ior.  Consider, for example, an essential difference
between experimental risk behavior and real-world
behavior under uncertainty: in an experimental setting,
probabilities are objective values provided by the
experimenter; in the real world, probabilities are sub-
jective beliefs or “feelings” an individual holds about
possible outcomes.  It is not clear that individuals hold
the cognitive ability to connect their beliefs (or feel-
ings) to the rational concept of probability.  But, it is
possible that individuals’behavior is in accordance
with expected utility outside of an experimental setting,
even if individuals cannot articulate those beliefs in
objective terms, such as probabilities.  For example, it
seems unlikely that a randomly chosen individual can
accurately report the probabilistic odds of experiencing
a car accident on two alternative driving routes, but that
person may still be capable to choose between them,
perhaps in accordance with EUT.  If an individual can
choose without articulating probabilities, then one
might want to reconsider the practical relevance of
decisions made in an artificial experimental context,
wherein objective probabilities exist, but wherein the
individual has not experienced the probabilities so as to
internalize exactly what they portend.
Another reason that few researchers have applied non-
EUT theories (so-called “generalized expected utility
theories”) is that many of these alternative theories
also fail to match all experimental evidence (Camerer). 
Experimental evidence aside, some economic data
suggest a psychological basis for some decisions under
risk.  Despite enormous research efforts, the so-called
“equity premium puzzle” (see the box on page 17)
remains deeply puzzling to financial economists.  And
leading theories that try to reconcile the large premium
that stocks earn over bonds are increasingly looking
toward psychological motives with roots in habit for-
mation, herd behavior, and generalized expected utility
models (Cambell and Cochrane, Shiller, Epstein and
Zin).  Psychology-based models have also been used
to explain certain features of life-cycle consumption
behavior (O’Donoghue and Rabin).
Future research in agriculture may benefit from fur-
ther application of these psychology-based models to
the empirical study of microeconomic production
decisions.
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On the back cover of their recent book, A
Comprehensive Assessment of the Role of Risk in 
U.S. Agriculture, Just and Pope write: “After all the
research on agricultural risk to date, the treatment of
risk in agricultural research is far from harmonious.”
Partly in an attempt to put some perspective on this
disharmony, we have systematically reviewed the dif-
ferent ways that risk can be important for agricultural
production decisions
To tease out the influences of risk, researchers have
been forced to make extreme and often unrealistic
assumptions so as to draw sharp conclusions.  Chapter
2 describes how risk influences decisions, even when
markets are perfect and all risks are insured.  In this
chapter, we have explained why all risks are not actual-
ly insured (because of market incompleteness caused
by asymmetric information) and reviewed the general
approaches used to approximate the effects of risk in
imperfect markets.  Although researchers have obtained
relatively precise conclusions regarding the effect of
risk using the no-risk-sharing and credit-constraints
approaches, in general, contract theory suggests that
there are no precise conclusions with regard to the
effect of risk on production choices.  Thus, it is not sur-
prising that research on agricultural risk lacks harmony.
There are several dimensions to the disharmony.  The
first dimension involves the contrast between risk’s
effects in perfect markets versus risk’s effects in
imperfect markets.  In perfect markets, risk affects out-
comes mainly through the interaction of decision tim-
ing and the timing of resolving uncertainties—in other
words, effects that pertain to information flows.  In
imperfect markets, the effect of risk affects outcomes
mainly through nonlinear objectives caused by imper-
fect risk-sharing or imperfect insurance.  These two
kinds of risk effects are fundamentally different.
Research, however, tends to focus on one kind of
effect to the exclusion of the other. In some instances,
research has explained the same empirical phenome-
non using both approaches.  One example concerns
excess nutrient applications in agriculture.  These can
be explained using a model in which applications must
be made before knowing the nutrient requirements of
crops.  If crop growth is a nonlinear function of fertil-
izer applications, then excess nutrients may often be
applied.  Excess applications have also been explained
as an attempt by farmers to reduce profit variability.
Another example, also prevalent outside agriculture
(especially macroeconomics), concerns the “lumpi-
ness” of capital expenditure over time.  This phenome-
non can be explained using the model of dynamic
uncertainty in Chapter 2 or via the credit-constraints
approach of Chapter 3.  There has been relatively little
research to date that attempts to reconcile the relative
importance of these two effects by considering them
simultaneously, or by carefully controlling for one
effect, while accurately measuring the other.
A second dimension involves the multitude of ways
risk can influence choices in the real world of imper-
fect markets.  The no-risk-sharing and credit-con-
straints approaches to approximating imperfect mar-
kets are necessarily crude approximations of the real
world.  Some of the disharmony may therefore arise
because the crude approximation used in one situation
may be less applicable to another.  Indeed, the crude
approximations may obscure the true effects of risk
altogether.
A third dimension of disharmony pertains to the chal-
lenges of empirical identification.  The challenge of
empirical identification is well understood in economics
generally: social scientists do not have laboratories in
which they can experimentally control for all factors,
and then carefully vary one (such as risk) so as to
uncover its effect.  This problem, however, is particular-
ly acute when attempting to measure the effects of risk.
To appreciate this difficulty, consider the challenges of
identifying the effects of risk on agricultural produc-
tion versus the effect of education on wages, a classic
topic in labor economics.  There is a positive correla-
tion between education and wages, and it may seem
reasonable that the higher wages of the more educated
are caused by the greater amount of time they spent in
school.  But maintaining the causal link is difficult.
Ability is likely correlated with both education and
wages; however, intrinsic ability is usually unobserv-
able.  The empirical challenge to measuring the returns
to education is to sort out the effects of education sep-
arate from intrinsic ability, which is hard to do.
Like labor economists who estimate the returns to edu-
cation, risk researchers also must control for the effect
of convoluting factors statistically associated with risk
but not caused by it (like, ability in the education-
wage example).  Two farms facing different risks are
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one be sure which differences are attributable to the
difference in risk as opposed to other differences,
especially when many of the other differences are
unobservable?  With risk, the identification problem is
even more difficult because there are so many ways
that risk could influence choices.  The researcher
needs to control not only for factors besides risk, but
also for all the different ways that risk is important, so
as not to confound one type of risk effect for another.
Perhaps the most challenging task with empirically
identifying the effects of risk involves measuring risk
in the first place. That is, a researcher needs measures
of risk and production decisions that are different
under different circumstances, like the different educa-
tion levels and wages of different individuals that are
used to measure returns from education.  Researchers
cannot ask farmers about objective measures of risk
and production decisions as easily as they can ask peo-
ple about their levels of education and wages.  How
does one quantify the level of risk on a farm?  And
how much does it actually vary from one farm to
another or from one year to another?  Even if
researchers’ notion of risk can be clearly communicat-
ed to farmers, it seems unlikely that farmers will be
able to communicate risk measures to researchers in a
consistent and objective way.
The data most readily available to agricultural risk
researchers are data on prices and yields.  Prices and
yields vary from year to year and from region to
region and may serve as a source for identifying some
kinds of risk effects.  To measure most kinds of risk
effects, however, the variance in yields must vary
from region to region and year to year.  Changes in
variance over time and space are more difficult to
objectively quantify, and are almost surely associated
with other factors, such as climate and soil types.  The
difference in variances across time and space also may
be too small to provide enough statistical power to
measure a risk effect of interest.  In other words, mea-
suring the importance of risk to production decisions
may be like trying to measure the returns from educa-
tion on earnings in a world where nearly everyone has
spent the same amount of time in school—the returns
may be large or small but the data cannot reveal which
is true.  Thus, it could be that some of the disharmony
in risk research has stemmed from inherent difficulties
involved with empirically identifying which of the risk
effects we have reviewed are most important for
understanding observed behavior.
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Glossary
agency costs Costs in monitoring or lost efficiency associated with providing appropriate incen-
tives in asymmetric information or “principal-agent” environments.
expected utility theory A theory for economic behavior that assumes preferences are linear in probabilities.  
That is, the value of a probability density function of possible states of the world (s), 
in which u(s) equals the utility should state s arise, is equal to Σs P(s)u(s), where P(s) 
denotes the probability that state s will occur.
risk aversion Usually a measure of the degree of curvature of a cardinal utility function of wealth.  
In general, a measure of preference of more certainty as compared to less certainty, 
all other factors remaining constant. 
moral hazard A situation in which an individual exploits an incentive scheme for personal gain 
against a greater social cost.  An extreme example might be insurance fraud (setting 
one’s house on fire to collect insurance).  More subtle examples include leaving the 
door unlocked to a car that is theft insured, or surfing the internet while at work 
(shirking).  In the economic literature, moral hazard is synonymous with hidden 
action information environments. 
adverse selection An asymmetric information environment in which one party cannot visibly distin-
guish different types or qualities. Without the proper incentive scheme (which is cost
ly) “bad” types will claim to be “good” types.
hidden information Like adverse selection except the “types” do not learn which type they are until after 
they have committed themselves to a contract (but before they make an unobservable 
decision, such as how much effort to exert).
independence axiom A key underlying assumption (and implication) of expected utility theory. If  the vec-
tors {p, q, and r} denote probabilities over a vector of possible outcomes (i.e., lotter-
ies), and p is preferred to q, then the independence axiom implies that αp + (1-α)r is 
preferred to αq + (1-α)r.
the revelation principle If an optimal incentive scheme in an asymmetric information environment exists, it 
will be one that causes all agents to truthfully reveal their types.
transaction costs The costs associated with exchanging goods and services (as opposed to physically 
producing them).  These costs may include physical costs such as search time and 
transportation costs as well as agency costs.Direct payments from the Federal Government to
farmers exceeded $20 billion per year in the years
1999-2001.  Nearly all of these payments were associ-
ated with government farm programs that targeted pro-
ducers of major field crops: corn, soybeans, wheat,
rice, and cotton.11 By comparison, total cash receipts
for these crops were less than $40 billion in 2000.12
Given the magnitude of the payments paid in conjunc-
tion with government programs for these crops relative
to receipts, they may strongly influence agricultural
production. Some of these programs include risk-miti-
gating features such as price-contingent payments and
subsidized crop insurance, and therefore may interact
with the risk effects described in Chapters 2 and 3.
This chapter briefly reviews the largest agricultural
programs with risk-mitigating features and discusses
possible implications for production.  To date, there
has been little research that examines how government
programs influence production via their risk-mitigating
features—most farm-program analyses use a “first-
order” approach that ignores risk effects discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3.  Although the report does not for-
mally analyze the effects of these subsidies from the
vantage of each of the risk-modeling approaches dis-
cussed in Chapters 2 and 3, it does suggest some qual-
itative predictions of these approaches.  Four of the
largest programs currently in place are reviewed: mar-
keting loans, lump-sum transfers (sometimes called
decoupled payments), disaster relief, and land retire-
ment programs.  Government programs may also
induce certain unintended consequences separate from




Figure 5 shows total government farm payments from
1933 to 1995 (in constant 1995 dollars). Government
programs for some crops (such as sugar, peanuts, and
tobacco) have been realized via trade restrictions and
other mechanisms that do not necessarily bring about
direct government payments to farmers.
Figure 6 shows total direct government farm payments
from 1996 to 2001.13 In this period, there were some
notable changes in the structure of agricultural pay-
ments. The 1996 farm act curtailed price-contingent
income supports for major commodities and replaced
them with Production Flexibility Contracts (PFCs).
The sizes of these lump-sum payments were deter-
mined by the amount of land enrolled in farm pro-
grams prior to 1996, and were scheduled to decline
after 1997.  In subsequent years, however, as prices
declined, PFC payments were augmented with
Marketing Loss Assistance (MLA) payments, which
scaled up the size of already-scheduled PFC payments.
MLA payments make up the majority of payments
classified as “Emergency Assistance” in figure 6.
Emergency assistance payments also include ad hoc
disaster relief.  This period also experienced rapid
growth in subsidized crop and revenue insurance and,
in the most recent years, growth in certain loan rates
(price-contingent payments, as explained below), most
notably, for soybeans.
One notable feature about government farm payments
is that they tend to be counter-cyclical with the eco-
nomic performance of the agricultural sector, especial-
ly over the last three decades.  Note that payments
reached record levels during the 1980’s farm crises,
declined as commodity prices increased in the early to
mid-1990s, and increased to new record levels during
recent years when commodity  prices fell.
The counter-cyclical nature of the payments is espe-
cially evident at the regional level, as seen in figure 7.
The counter-cyclical nature of the payments is evident
in all the regions, but especially so in the Heartland
and Northern Great Plains, regions where government
payments are highest relative to net farm income and
net farm income is most variable.14 It appears as
though government payments insure (partially) risks to
farm income. 
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11See Wescott and Young for a breakdown of payments by type
and crop in the year 2000.
12Total cash receipts for agriculture as a whole were about $194.5
billion in 2001.
13The figure excludes insurance indemnity payments, for which
the associated premiums were heavily subsidized after 1994.
14See Heimlich for details on how these farm resource regions
are defined.Relative to both government payments and net farm
income, agricultural land values (the dotted line in fig-
ure 7) are relatively stable.  The relative stability of
land values may also suggest a role of insurance
played by government payments.  The land value data,
however, are interpolated between Census years (1978,
1982, 1987, and 1997), so the apparent stability may
be a spurious feature of data construction.
Price-Contingent Payments
At present, USDA uses the Marketing Loan Program
to support (in effect) prices farmers receive for certain
commodities.  Marketing loans allow farmers to bor-
row the posted “loan rate” for each unit of a commodi-
ty produced and stored as collateral.  They may later
sell the commodity on the open market and repay the
loan (if prices are above the loan rate), or default on
the loan without recourse (if prices are below the loan
rate).  Alternatively, farmers can elect to receive a loan
deficiency payment for the difference between the loan
rate and market-derived price, should the loan rate turn
out higher. Thus, the loan rate effectively serves as a
floor on prices farmers receive.15
A price floor affects both the expected return and the
level of risk that farmers face.  First, by truncatingthe
bottom of the distribution function of anticipated
prices, the price floor increases the average or 
expected price farmers receive.  Second, it reduces
the amount of downside price risk.  In perfect mar-
kets, the first aspect is most relevant: the greater aver-
age return induces greater production.  This effect
ultimately entails a certain loss in economic efficien-
cy.  Excess production must be stored, destroyed, or
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Figure 6
Government farm payments, 1996-2001
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15More details on the current marketing loan program and how it
has changed over time can be found in Westcott and Price.
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Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Billions of 1995 dollarssold on the world market at a price that is lower than
its economic cost.
In the simple two-period approach of Chapter 2, the
second effect is zero (recall the equivalence result for
price uncertainty).  In the dynamic uncertainty approach
reviewed in Chapter 2 and in all the approaches of
Chapter 3, both effects matter: reduced downside risk
and increased expected returns both induce greater pro-
duction. Unlike the first effect, the second one may
increase efficiency rather than reduce it.
There also are more subtle general equilibrium effects
to consider.  As domestic farmers collectively produce
more in response to the greater expected returns, the
average world price falls.  Thus, the greater the loan
rate, the lower the world price.  If farmers also pro-
duce more because of the risk-mitigating features of
price supports, then world prices could be pushed even
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Notes: The solid line indicates net farm income (NFI), less government payments; the dashed line indicates direct government payments (G); the dotted 
line indicates agricultural land values (LV). Land values (the right-side axis) are on a scale equal to exactly 3 times that of government payments and net
farm income (the left-side axis), so relative values can be visually compared across regions. All values are in 1996 dollars. Net income and government 
payments data were interpolated from  county-level census data on land and buildings with the value of buildings removed. See Heimlich for a more thorough
description of the nine farm regions.
Figure 7
Comparison of net farm income, government payments, and land values
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.lower. These general equilibrium effects are largest for
commodities for which domestic production comprises
a large share of the world market, such as soybeans
and especially corn.
Pre-1996 farm payments, which mostly stemmed from
the target-price-deficiency-payment program, were
contingent on certain features that offset the excess
supply they might have induced.  The target-price-
deficiency-payment did not entail government accu-
mulation of commodities via defaulted loans—it sim-
ply paid farmers the difference between a posted target
price and the market price on enrolled acreage (if the
target price was higher than the market price).  Unlike
the loan-rate program, the payments were allotted
according to base acres and historically based yields,
not actual production. Base acres were allocated via a
formula of farmers’ historical plantings, a formula that
has changed over time.  Thus, if target prices were
especially high in one year then farmers could not
quickly increase their acreage to take immediate
advantage of it; instead, they had to slowly accumulate
their base acreage over time.  Pre-1996 programs also
offset supply response by requiring that farmers “set
aside” (leave fallow) a certain percentage of their
acreage in order to participate in the program and
receive the subsidies.  Although these restrictions are
not part of the current loan rate program, base acres
still dictate the size of lump-sum decoupled and
counter-cyclical payments.
Since the 1985 Food Security Act, eligibility for the
loan-rate program and other subsidies does require
cross-compliance with certain provisions to conserve
soil and wetlands (notably the so-called sodbuster and
swampbuster provisions).
Lump Sum or Decoupled Payments
The structure of farm program payments changed
markedly in 1996, a time when market prices stood
well above target prices and program payments were
historically low.  Unlike the pre-1996 programs, the
amounts of these decoupled Production Flexibility
Contracts (PFC) and Market Loss Assistance (MLA)
payments do not depend on the acreage farmers’
plant, nor the crops they plant, nor other current pro-
duction choices.  Economists have long advocated
decoupled payments of this kind over subsidies such
as price supports because they provide income trans-
fers to farmers without distorting commodity produc-
tion.  If markets function perfectly (as described in
Chapter 2), then PFC and MLA payments should not
influence production.
If, on the other hand, markets are imperfect (as
described in Chapter 3), then lump-sum payments hold
ambiguous consequences for production. The payments
may provide farmers with more resources to finance
production.  Alternatively, the payments may cause
farmers to feel wealthier and more inclined to spend
their time in leisure rather than in work, so they may
produce less.  However, because farmers receiving pay-
ments represent a small share of the aggregate labor
force, this small shift in labor supply should have negli-
gible consequences in general equilibrium.  Compared
with the farm programs that these payments replaced,
the lump-sum payments may also provide farmers with
less insurance against unexpected price declines.
Crop and Revenue Insurance
Although non-subsidized private multi-peril crop insur-
ance is unavailable in agriculture, it is ambiguous
whether this “missing market” is a result of asymmetric
information (like Akerlof’s market for lemons
described in Chapter 3), because insurance companies
do not have the financial resources to insure wide-
spread disasters, or because government insurance pro-
grams have crowded out private insurance markets.
Because government agricultural programs have been
around for so long, it is difficult to predict what private
insurance markets would look like in their absence.
Brief History of Insurance
This section briefly reviews the history of crop insur-
ance programs.  (See Coble and Knight and Glauber
and Collins for more detailed reviews.)
Congress first authorized Federal crop insurance with
establishment of the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation (FCIC) in 1938. The program was initiat-
ed as an experiment, limited mostly to major crops in
the main producing areas, and participation rates were
low.  Crop insurance remained experimental until pas-
sage of the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. 
Since 1980, the crop insurance program has steadily
increased the number of crops insured and the level of
premium subsidies to induce greater participation.  The
goal of the subsidies has been to obviate the need for
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percent of the premium. By 1994, the premiums for
participating farmers were entirely subsidized for cata-
strophic risk protection (coverage for 50 percent of
average yield at 60 percent of expected price).  If
farmers elected a coverage level of at least 65 percent
of yield at 100 percent of expected price, then the per-
acre subsidy was 25 percent larger than the catastroph-
ic premium rate.  Program participation also required
farmers to pay a $50 sign-up fee for each crop insured
per county.
Beginning in 1996, farmers who elected not to enroll
in the crop insurance program with the minimum cata-
strophic coverage were required to waive their eligibil-
ity for Federal disaster assistance that might be made
available later in the crop year. Although these provi-
sions are still in effect, disaster relief was provided to
both insured and uninsured farmers subsequent to the
1996 provision.  In low-yield years, some insured
farmers, through a combination of insurance indemni-
ties plus disaster relief, obtained well over 100 percent
of their expected returns. 
Participation increased markedly with the 1994 subsi-
dies, with about two-thirds of field crop acreage and
over 80 percent of eligible acreage insured under the
1994 program.  Insured acreage, however, included
less than half the eligible farms; and more than half
the insured acreage included only catastrophic cover-
age.  Prior to the large 1994 increase in subsidies, par-
ticipating acres included less than 40 percent of those
eligible.  Since 1994, the program has expanded cover-
age to more crops and, under the Agricultural Risk
Protection Act of 2000, subsidies for coverage above
the catastrophic level have increased.
Implications
Like price supports, federally subsidized crop insur-
ance changes both the average returns and risk from
farming.  By paying indemnities when yield or rev-
enue is less than a specified value, crop insurance
modifies the net-revenue distribution function by trun-
cating the lower end, while the premiums reduce net
revenue for all states of nature.  If insurance were
actuarially fair, then the premium would equal the
expected value of the indemnity payment, and average
returns would remain unchanged.  For most kinds of
insurance available in private markets (such as auto-
mobile, life, and homeowners insurance), premiums
are larger than indemnities on average—that is how
insurance companies cover their expenses and earn
profits.  With federally subsidized crop insurance,
however, the unsubsidized share of the premium is less
than the indemnity payment on average—the govern-
ment loses money on average.  Participating farmers
therefore enjoy both higher average profits and lower
risk from participation.
Because crop insurance is both profitable and risk
reducing, one might expect nearly full participation by
growers.  It is therefore puzzling that such large premi-
um subsidies were required to induce participation.
There are at least three explanations for this anomaly.
First, because land is heterogeneous, some fields have
different yield distribution functions than others, dif-
ferences that cannot be accurately measured.  Farmers,
having better information about yield potential than
insurers do, may choose to insure only the fields that
are profitable to insure.  In other words, there is a
problem of adverse selection.
Second, farmers may expect to receive disaster relief
(discussed in the next section) even if they choose not
to participate, in effect receiving free insurance.
Although nonparticipating farmers are required to
waive their eligibility for disaster relief, in practice
both nonparticipating and participating farmers have
received disaster compensation in recent years.
A third explanation could be that in the current asym-
metric information environment, farmers actually
behave as if they are “risk loving.”  If farmers are
credit constrained (as described in Chapter 3), it is
unclear exactly how risk choices are augmented by the
constraint.  It is possible that farmers face limited lia-
bility on the downside (they may declare bankruptcy
for a limited cost), but obtain new investment opportu-
nities on the upside, causing them to seek risk, all
other factors remaining constant.  Indeed, theoretical
research using the contracting approach (described in
Chapter 3) shows that risk-loving choices result from
optimal contracts in limited liability environments
(Ghatak and Pandey).
Some argue that farmers who receive crop insurance
reduce input use because indemnities compensate for
under-applications, a form of moral hazard (Quiggen;
Horowitz and Lichtenberg).  In general, predictions
about input use depend on whether inputs are risk-
increasing or risk-decreasing, among other assump-
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side risk will have an incentive to choose inputs so as
to increase yield risk.  If an input is risk-increasing,
more will be applied per acre; if it is risk-decreasing,
then less will be applied per acre.  To the extent that
subsidized insurance increases overall returns, there
also could be an expansion of acreage farmed  (which
increases input use (Chambers and Quiggen)).  
Coble and Knight provide a recent review of the
research that examines crop insurance participation
incentives.  Research by Young and Vanderveer and
Goodwin and Vanderveer examine the effect of crop
insurance subsidies on planted acreage.
Disaster Assistance
Congress has regularly provided ad hoc emergency
assistance to farmers to partially or totally offset
financial losses due to severe weather and other nat-
ural disasters (e.g., drought or flood) or stressful eco-
nomic conditions.  Although these programs insure
farm income somewhat, the ad hoc nature of the
assistance makes this program less amenable to sys-
tematic analysis.
In recent years, the overall level of disaster assistance
has increased markedly.  After accounting for inflation,
disaster payments in 2000 were greater than in 1994,
the previous record set for these payments due to the
1993 Midwestern floods.  Disaster assistance pay-
ments from 1991 to 2001, adjusted for inflation, are
plotted in figure 8.  These payments do not include the
Market Loss Assistance payments described above,
which provided compensation for generally low prices,
not for specific disasters.
Land Retirement Programs
Since the 1950s, land retirement programs have served
as the largest kind of agricultural conservation pro-
gram.  These programs pay farmers to remove land
from cropland production to provide environmental
benefits and limit crop supply.  At present, land retire-
ment takes place mainly through the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP).
The CRP, USDA’s largest conservation program, pays
an annual rent to participating farmers to remove high-
ly erodible or otherwise environmentally sensitive land
from agricultural production and shares the cost of
establishing land cover, usually in the form of trees or
grass. The rental contracts last for 10 to 15 years and
are allocated on a competitive basis, with bids weight-
ed according to an index that includes environmental
characteristics of the land and the rental payment
requested by the farmer.  Lands eligible for enrollment
must have recently been used in crop production and
have a minimum degree of environmental sensitivity.
The primary goal of the program is to reduce soil ero-
sion, improve water quality, foster wildlife habitat, and
provide other environmental benefits.
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Figure 8
Total disaster payments to farmers, 1991-2000, in year 2000 dollars
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Billion dollarsBecause CRP enrollment substitutes a fixed payment for
an uncertain crop return, it affects the income risk asso-
ciated with participating farm operations and, depending
on the size of the rental payment, also may affect the
average returns.  It is therefore possible that the risk
effects described in Chapter 3 will influence production
choices on lands not enrolled in CRP.  For example, in
the no-risk-sharing approach, farmers may be willing to
plant new cropland and/or take on new risks since a
portion of their income is assured under CRP.
This possible risk effect underlies one rationale for
slippage observed in land retirement programs.
Slippage is a term associated with the phenomenon that
total commodity production decreases proportionately
less than the proportion of acres retired.  The main rea-
son slippage occurs is because the retired land tends to
be of lower-than-average quality and therefore have
lower-than-average yields.  Another source of slippage
could be that farmers simply plant new cropland to
substitute for land idled under the program (Wu).  Yet
another way slippage might occur is through a price-
feedback effect: because CRP shifts supply inward,
prices increase, which may induce farmers to convert
noncropland to cropland.  However, because the supply
shift is small relative to the world market, there should
be only a small price response.  The risk effect pro-
vides another rationale for this kind of slippage.
Before enrolling land in the CRP, farmers may have
been unwilling to expand production (and increase risk)
due to risk aversion.  With reduced risk from CRP,
enrolled farmers may be willing to take on additional
risk through expanded production.  Counter to this sup-
position, recent research suggests that slippage in the
form of noncropland to cropland substitutions is, in
fact, small (Roberts and Bucholtz).
Conclusion
Among the risk-modeling approaches reviewed in
Chapters 2 and 3, most analyses of agricultural pro-
duction decisions have utilized either the simple two-
period model of Chapter 2 or the no-risk-sharing
approach of Chapter 3.  Furthermore, except for some
of the research on crop insurance, analysis of govern-
ment programs has mainly used the two-period model
of Chapter 2.  That is, most analyses ignore risk-cop-
ing costs by assuming markets are perfect—so yield
and price risks are unimportant—and then, approxi-
mate effects of government programs using equivalent
per-unit subsidies, in effective, these amount to supply
and demand analyses.  One might refer to this
approach as a “first-order” analysis, because it exam-
ines only incentives that relate to average profits.  In
addition to expected values, risk effects may also be
deemed important.  In that case, assessment of these
risks, estimates of how farmers and market intermedi-
aries respond to them, and appraisals of how govern-
ment agricultural programs interact with these respons-
es requires a modeling approach that somehow charac-
terizes the market imperfections causing risk to be
important in the first place (like the approaches
reviewed in Chapter 3).  One might refer to this
approach as a “second-order” analysis, because profit
variance will play an important role.
Although second-order risk effects may be unimpor-
tant for some kinds of questions, they may be impor-
tant for others.  On the one hand, if the analyst wishes
to focus on a specific consequence of a government
program, such as the acreage response to a higher
crop-insurance subsidy, then risk effects might be safe-
ly ignored.  Because even first-order acreage responses
are likely to be small (cropland supply elasticities are
highly inelastic), there seems to be little need of a sec-
ond-order analysis.  On the other hand, if the analyst
wishes to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of a crop
insurance program, then a second-order analysis may
be necessary.  Because the deadweight loss—a mea-
sure of economic inefficiency induced by first-order
distortions—is likely to be small, it is possible that the
second-order gains from a government program will
offset the deadweight loss associated with first-order
distortions, even if second-order effects are small in
size. The potential second-order benefits provided by
these programs might include increased farm produc-
tivity (the credit constraints approach of Chapter 3)
and consumption smoothing of farm households (all
Chapter 3 approaches), both of which could be associ-
ated with the farm-income stability they promote.
These features, among others, are ignored when the
second-order effects associated with risk response are
not incorporated into government program analyses.
The practical problem with incorporating risk effects
into analysis of government programs is the inadequa-
cy of the current understanding of these effects.
Before applying imperfect-markets approaches to
analysis of government programs, researchers may
first want to try reconciling some of the disharmony
among approaches to modeling imperfect markets.
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base acres The number of acres to which many agricultural subsidies are tied.  In recent years, 
Production Flexibility Payments and Market Loss Assistance Payments were determined
according to a farm’s 1996 base acres.  Base acres are determined by a formula of his-
torical plantings, a formula that has changed over the years.
decoupled Agricultural subsidies that are not tied to the current level of production or planting 
government  decisions.
payments
general equilibrium As opposed to a partial equilibrium, in which prices usually are fixed, a general 
equilibrium takes into account price feedback from other factors, such as demand. 
slippage  The difference between the proportional reduction in land and the proportional 
reduction in production. The term is usually used in reference to land retirement 
programs.  Within these programs, the total amount produced usually declines less
that proportionately with the number of acres idled, resulting in slippage.
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that determine how much of what crops to produce
and how to produce them.  These jointly determined
decisions include: intensive-margin choices, such as
per-acre applications of pesticides, fertilizer, or irriga-
tion water; extensive-margin choices, such the
amount of land used for crops and livestock, the allo-
cation of acreage among different crops, and crop rota-
tions; and technology adoption choices, which
include machinery, irrigation type, tillage practice, use
of precision technologies, and seed type. Technology
choice may influence extensive-margin choices, and
both technology and extensive-margin choices affect
intensive-margin choices.
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on simple examples to illus-
trate the different ways risk might influence produc-
tion choices.  Some of the examples showed how risk,
through its influence on production, may indirectly
influence the environment.  Chapter 4 explained how
government programs such as crop insurance and price
supports influence both the expected returns and vari-
ability of returns, and therefore may influence produc-
tion and (indirectly) environmental problems.
Chapters 2 and 3 referred to these choices abstractly
using the vector x.  This chapter reviews more com-
prehensively the production alternatives available to
farmers and how these alternatives collectively influ-
ence productivity, risk, and the environment.  This
chapter focuses mainly on the basic tradeoffs available
to growers and policymakers, rather than the motives
that underlie the production decisions actually made.
The Agro-Environmental System
Agricultural production choices affect both production
efficiency and the environment by changing the topog-
raphy and plant and animal life on land and in water-
ways; by influencing aesthetics, water flows and quali-
ty, soil quality and erosion; and by introducing syn-
thetic chemicals into the environmental system.
Environmental conditions, such as weather, soil type
and fertility, soil moisture, and the stochastic variabili-
ty of these conditions, in turn, influence grower pro-
duction decisions. Ultimately, the environmental
effects of production choices depend on the resulting
mix of crops grown and the production practices used.
Many interest groups are concerned about the effects
of production and input choices on worker safety, con-
sumer health, fish and wildlife, ground and surface
water quality, air quality, and soil erosion.
Intensive-Margin Choices
Intensive-margin choices usually pertain to per-acre
use of variable inputs on agricultural land.  The inten-
sive-margin inputs mainly include labor, fertilizers,
irrigation water, and pesticides.  Holding land quality,
crop choice, capital, and technology fixed, these inputs
influence profits mainly by their effect on yields, prod-
uct quality, and cost.  The use of these inputs has been
associated with various adverse health and environ-
mental effects (USDA, ERS, 2002).  Due to these
effects, the agricultural economics literature probably
has studied these inputs more than the others. 
Most analyses of input response to risk on the inten-
sive margin use models akin to the nutrient example
in Chapter 2, the no-risk-sharing approach reviewed
in Chapter 3, or some combination of the two. Pope
and Kramer (1979) discussed a model that underlies
many arguments that risk-reducing or information-
increasing programs, such as crop insurance or new
precision technologies, may encourage increased effi-
ciency and/or decreased use of risk-reducing inputs,
such as pesticides.  
It remains controversial, however, whether pesticides,
irrigation, and fertilizer applications increase,
decrease, or have no effect on yield and profit risks
(Leathers and Quiggen, 1991 and Horowitz and
Lichtenberg, 1993).  The conventional wisdom is that
pesticide use and irrigation reduce profit risk while
fertilizer use increases profit risk, as measured by vari-
ance (Leathers and Quiggen, 1991).  Horowitz and
Lichtenberg (1993) argued, based on an empirical
analysis, that pesticides can increase risk in some cir-
cumstances.  Other authors, such as Babcock and
Hennessey (1996) and Smith and Goodwin (1996),
questioned their argument and result, suggesting that
model specification was a problem. Other research
indicates irrigation may increase risk and that fertilizer
use may reduce risk under some circumstances. Thus,
even within the confines of the no-risk-sharing
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Chapter 5–Production Decisions and the Environmentapproach, it remains ambiguous how risk influences
the use of these inputs and vice versa.  
Whether or not intensive-margin applications increase
or decrease yield variance depends in part on the infor-
mation available to the farmer at the time of applica-
tion.  Recall the nutrient and irrigation examples in
Chapter 2.  The more accurate a farmer’s assessment
of nutrient and water needs, the more precise will be
the applications of these inputs, which could lead to
more or less applied on average.  As a result, technolo-
gies that reduce uncertainties about input need may
change the use of intensive-margin inputs.
Greater application precision, however, may lead to
either increased or decreased yield variance.  On the
one hand, greater precision may push all yields up
toward the maximum growth potential, increasing the
average and reducing the variance.  On the other hand,
other stochastic factors that influence growth (such as
sunlight and rainfall) may drive input need (the
amount that maximizes yield, all other factors being
constant).  High input needs therefore may occur when
yields are either especially low or especially high.  For
example, low sunlight may reduce both yields and irri-
gation needs, while steady rainfall increases yields and
reduces irrigation needs.
Following the notation from the nutrient example in
Chapter 2, define agronomic need as n’ and the
amount applied as n*.  Agronomic need is variable and
may be uncertain at the time of application. If need is
known at application time and the input is costless,
then n* = n’.  Thus, the relationship between applica-
tion rates, average return, and return variance is
ambiguous and depends on three factors: 
1) The information available with respect to agro-
nomic need of the input (uncertainty about n’).
2) The stochastic relationship between marginal 
needs and yield (covariance of yield and n’).
3) The relationship between agronomic need and 
other factors, such as input costs and output price.
Both the information available and application timing
(the level and uncertainty about n’) are endogenous—
they are determined in part by other input decisions.
The following subsections discuss specific kinds of
intensive margin inputs, possible environmental con-
sequences of their use, and how risk can influence
their application.
Pest Controls
Farmers use pesticides, biological methods, and cultur-
al techniques, to prevent yield and quality losses from
insects, nematodes, diseases, and weeds. Post-harvest
practices are also used to control pests during storage
and shipment. Pests can reduce not only the amount of
product harvested, but also the product quality and the
price received.  In addition, counterproductive effects
of pesticide use, such as increased pest resistance and
the mortality of pests’ natural predators, can reduce the
efficacy of future pesticide treatments.
Depending on the active ingredient, inappropriate use
of agricultural pesticides may create adverse human
health effects by contaminating food and drinking
water or exposing farm workers, as well as adversely
affect the health of desirable wild animals and plants.
Some health effects, especially those stemming from
chronic exposure to pesticides, are difficult to measure.
Pest infestations are probabilistic events. Some pests
may be chronic problems that cause damages year
after year, while others may pose infrequent threats of
large damage. Pest infestations and the susceptibility
of crops to damage can vary within a season and
between seasons depending on a variety of factors,
such as weather and previous cropping practices. 
Some authors characterize pesticides as damage con-
trol agents that prevent yield loss when an infestation
occurs but have no effect otherwise (Leathers and
Quiggin, 1991 and Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1986).
By reducing damages when pest infestations occur,
pesticide use will increase average yields and reduce
yield variance (similar to figure 2 concerning irrigation
in Chapter 2), as long as pest infestations are the only
variable factor in the crop-pest system and there are no
auxiliary effects.  Auxiliary effects include increased
pest resistance and eradication of pest predators, pesti-
cide-induced damages to plants (if the pesticide is phy-
totoxic), and ways pest infestations relate to other sto-
chastic factors that affect profits, such as yield and
output price.  Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) argued
that if pest infestations interact with other stochastic
factors affecting yields or profits, increased pesticide
use can increase risk.
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scouting or monitoring to reduce uncertainties regard-
ing pest infestations and damages, and thereby apply
pest controls more judiciously. Some research suggests
that poor information about the degree of infestation
leads to higher application rates (Feder, 1979), but this
result is not generally true (as in the nutrient model in
Chapter 2). 
Some research suggests that producers overestimate
average insect and disease damages and consequently
over-apply pesticides (Pingali and Carlson, 1985).
Research also suggests that younger farmers who have
more schooling and who use scouting or Extension
Service information make less use of pesticides and
more use of more labor-intensive control practices.
Pesticide use increased markedly during the 1960s and
1970s as the percentage of acreage treated with these
materials increased, peaking in the early 1980s when
total cropland also was historically high.  Since the
early 1980s, aggregate pesticide use has remained rela-
tively stable (figure 9).
Irrigation 
In the most arid regions of the West, where precipita-
tion can be the limiting factor for crop growth, irriga-
tion is essential for production of certain crops, includ-
ing some high-value vegetable and tree crops.  In other
areas of the United States, where precipitation can be
sufficient to support crop production in most years,
irrigation augments soil moisture during drier periods,
prevents associated yield losses, and therefore increas-
es average yields and reduces yield variance.
Irrigation often is the basis for more intensive crop
production systems that increase the use of other
inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides. However, irri-
gation can reduce water available from groundwater or
reservoir supplies for other uses.  It can also affect
water quality through increased nutrient leaching,
increased nutrient and salt concentrations in runoff to
surface water, or increased salinity in poorly drained
soils. Diversion of water for irrigation in the West has
reduced or eliminated flows in many streams, which
has reduced or destroyed habitat for many species,
such as salmon (National Research Council, 1996). 
Irrigation may help producers capture peak prices
attributable to drought-induced production shortfalls,
particularly for price-sensitive local markets such as
forage hay, fresh fruit, and vegetables.  In many areas
of the country, irrigation contributes to higher quality
and higher valued fruit and vegetable production,
through control of freeze damage and crop cooling to
delay early flowering or maturation. Fertilizers, pesti-
cides, and other chemicals may be applied within the
irrigation system, providing more controlled applica-
tion and increased production potential.  Irrigation may
also be used for manure spreading, thereby reducing
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Figure 9
Pesticide use on major crops
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tions for combined livestock and forage operations.
Some researchers argue that irrigation is an important
risk-reducing input (Boggess et al., 1983).  The prima-
ry source of risk reduction involves reduced yield vari-
ability and crop loss resulting from inadequate soil
moisture in the crop root zone.  When irrigation sup-
plements rainfall, a probabilistic event, it has the char-
acteristics of a damage control agent, such as a pesti-
cide, and could simultaneously increase expected yield
and reduce variance—if managed so that no crop dam-
age occurs.  However, the timing and quantity of water
applications could influence whether or not irrigation
increases or decreases yield risk.
For example, figure 10 plots corn yields in Boone
County, Nebraska, a county that has a long history of
large plantings of both irrigated and nonirrigated
acreage. Although the data suggest that irrigation appli-
cations increase average yields and reduce yield vari-
ance, some of the difference may occur because irrigat-
ed and nonirrigated lands are different in other respects.
Incomplete information about soil moisture and weath-
er has implications for decisions about quantities of
irrigated water applied, timing of applications, and
crops irrigated (Bosch and Eidman, 1987).
Information value stems from more efficient water
application with respect to its marginal return, which
varies depending on other stochastic conditions (See
the nutrient example in Chapter 2).  
Fertilizers
Farmers use chemical fertilizers, manure and other
organic materials, and/or crop rotations to replace
nutrients withdrawn from the soil during production of
certain crops (such as corn). Without augmenting the
soil with nutrients, crop yields or quality would
decline in many cases.  Primary nutrients for crop
growth and development include nitrogen, phosphorus,
and potassium, but other micro-nutrients are also
important. If improperly applied, fertilizers can leach
into groundwater or drain into surface water. Nutrients
in surface water can cause eutrophication, oxygen
depletion, fish kills, and reduction in recreation oppor-
tunities.  High nitrate levels in drinking water also
have adverse human health effects.
Fertilizers, especially nitrogen, have been identified as
risk-increasing inputs based on the results of field
studies.  A risk-averse farmer, therefore, would apply
fertilizers less frequently than a risk-neutral one
(Leathers and Quiggen, 1991). Fertilizer use may
increase the mean and variance of yields by increasing
the probability of high yields under some conditions,
such as adequate rainfall, and of low yields under
other conditions, such as inadequate rainfall when
chemical burning can occur. However, some research
indicates that fertilizer use reduces the probabilities of
lower yields (Babcock and Hennessy, 1996). Some
farmers may perceive nitrogen fertilizer as a risk-
reducing input, based on their experience
(SriRamaratnam and others, 1987). 
As with pesticides and irrigation, incomplete informa-
tion about nutrient availability is an important source of
uncertainty.  Information and decision criteria, such as
those obtained from biophysical simulation models, can
influence fertilizer application decisions. Soil and tissue
tests provide estimates of nutrient deficits, which can
result in more accurate application rates. Precision
farming techniques with variable rate technologies can
help to minimize the yield variation in a field. To the
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Figure 10
Comparing yields of irrigated and nonirrigated corn
Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA.
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Notes: Red indicates irrigated yields; blue indicates nonirrigated
yields. The standard deviations of the residuals (differences between 
actual yields and the fitted trend line) for irrigated and nonirrigated
acreage are 11.8 and 17.8 respectively. The coefficents of variation 
for irrigated and nonirrigated are 0.11 and 0.30, respectively.extent that uncertainty leads to “over-application,” soil
or tissue tests might reduce application rates
(SriRamaratnam and others, 1987).  However, some
studies show that testing might have no effect on appli-
cation rates or perhaps increase them (Musser and oth-
ers, 1995).  Extreme wet or dry weather can reduce the
value of soil tests, to the extent that benefits do not
cover costs (Huang, Lu, and Uri, 1999).
Fertilizer loss after application, which is affected by
weather, is a stochastic event that creates uncertainty
about the amount of the nutrient in the soil available for
the crop’s uptake. As a result, farmers may increase the
amount of fertilizer applied to ensure that enough of the
nutrient is available for the crop (Babcock, 1992). 
Extensive-Margin Choices
For crop production, extensive-margin choices entail
how many acres of what crops should be grown.
Decisions about what crops to grow reflect expecta-
tions of returns, including expectations of prices,
yields, and costs. 
Land and associated natural factors, such as climate,
are important factors in crop production. Natural fac-
tors such as climate, soil type, fertility, and soil mois-
ture affect yield. Production costs and response to pro-
duction inputs also affect yield, while the distance
from markets or transportation terminals can affect the
net returns to crops and alternative uses.  Variability of
such factors as temperature, rainfall, and distance from
markets contributes to regional differences in crops
grown and production practices. Variability of natural
factors such as soil type, slope, moisture, and fertility
within individual operations or fields are sources of
spatial yield variability, influencing the choices of
crops and production practices.
Natural factors also influence the environmental
effects of crop choices.  The combinations of crop and
management practices, including crop rotations and
tillage, and natural factors, such as soil type and slope,
affect water runoff into streams and percolation into
groundwater, which, in turn, affect soil erosion, and
the movement of pesticides and nutrients into aquatic
systems.  Farm production choices also influence pop-
ulations of desirable and undesirable wildlife, insect,
disease, and plant species by modifying their habitats.
Row crops, such as corn, cotton, or soybeans, general-
ly encourage more surface runoff and erosion than
close-grown crops, such as small grains or alfalfa.
Continuous production of row crops can result in
greater infestations of some pests than some crop rota-
tions (USDA, ERS, 2002).
The choice of crops affects the average level and vari-
ability of net returns.  In a static, deterministic frame-
work, growers choose crops that maximize net returns;
but for a variety of reasons, yields, prices, and costs
are uncertain.  In particular, yields of some crops may
be more susceptible to drought, pests, or other losses
than other crops.  Some growers may choose crops
with potentially high returns that are susceptible to
yield losses and protect them with pesticides, fertiliz-
ers, and irrigation. Other growers may choose crops
with potentially lower returns but with less need for
additional inputs. For example, some growers in
drought-prone areas might choose to grow irrigated
corn or cotton, while others choose to grow nonirrigat-
ed sorghum.  Some crop rotations may have pest con-
trol or fertility benefits, but, in the absence of crop
insurance, may also help growers to diversify against
revenue losses from price variability and yield losses
(Freund, 1956).
Economic incentives, whether created by high output
or low input prices or by government subsidies, can
encourage changes in crop choices that increase the
acreage of some crops and reduce the acreage of oth-
ers. These changes can have environmental implica-
tions.  Increases in the acreage of crops with high
input use can increase soil erosion and deposit more
pesticides and fertilizers into the environment.  In
some cases, more erosion-encouraging crops could be
substituted for soil-conserving crops on less productive
(in terms of fertility, soil moisture, or other natural fac-
tors that contribute to higher net returns) and more
erodible land.  For example, high corn prices or pro-
gram subsidies and low alfalfa prices could encourage
growers to increase corn and reduce alfalfa acreage.
This crop change would tend to increase erosion on
acreage previously growing alfalfa, and to the extent
that alfalfa was planted on more erodible acreage, the
erosion would be even greater than on the average
corn acre.
Technology Adoption Choices
By adopting new technology in the form of new pro-
duction practices and equipment, growers may be able
to produce crops where they could not be previously
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production costs.  These decisions affect the level and
variability of net returns.  Some changes can be minor
modifications of current production systems to
improve efficiency, such as using a new pesticide or
seed variety.  In more extreme cases, growers may
make major changes in crops grown and production
practices that require major investments in equipment
and management skills.  For example, a grower might
change from growing a dryland crop, such as sorghum
or hay, to more input-intensive irrigated corn or cotton
or, perhaps, high-value fruit or vegetable crops.
These adoption decisions can affect what crops are
grown, where they are grown, what inputs are used,
and, thus, have environmental implications. An impor-
tant trend throughout the 20th century was the
increased use of agricultural chemicals, machinery,
new seed hybrids and varieties, as well as irrigation
equipment and reductions in per-acre labor use, all of
which contributed to increased productivity.  For
example, synthetic organic herbicides, first developed
during World War II, were used on more than 90 per-
cent of corn acreage by 1980 (Osteen and Szmedra,
1989).  These changes contributed to public policy
concerns about the health and environmental effects of
pesticides, fertilizers, and irrigation. However, some
new technologies may improve production efficiency
and reduce adverse environmental effects.  Precision
agriculture methods can apply variable rates of pesti-
cides or fertilizers within a field based on sub-field
level information about pest infestations or nutrient
needs.  Some genetically modified crops can reduce
the application of some synthetic organic pesticides.
Growers face a number of risks when adopting new
practices or equipment, with incomplete information
being a major source of risk. New products might not
be accepted in the marketplace, causing product prices
to be lower than anticipated.  New practices, pesti-
cides, or equipment may not perform as anticipated.
Growers may not have the management skills or
knowledge to effectively use new equipment and attain
the desired results from new practices.  The greater the
change in production practices and equipment, the
greater these uncertainties might be.
Some adoption decisions require investments that cre-
ate financial risk.  Growers might have to purchase
specialized irrigation, tillage, or pesticide application
equipment.  Replanting an orchard to a new crop or
variety may require destroying the old orchard, planti-
ng new trees, and waiting for trees to mature to bear-
ing age.  When debt is incurred, the grower needs to
maintain a cash flow for loan payments.  Price or yield
variability can be important concerns for investment
decisions, because the grower might not have suffi-
cient revenue for loan payments in years when prices
or yields are low.  To justify taking such a risk, the
grower may plant crops that promise a higher return,
but might also choose inputs, production practices, or
insurance to reduce risks associated with price and
yield variability.  For example, irrigation may con-
tribute to higher valued crops, higher yields, and
reduced yield variability, but the grower incurs debt
and higher annual production costs (Boggess and
Amerling, 1983).  However, growers might diversify
crop choices and use pesticides, fertilizers, and irriga-
tion practices to prevent yield or revenue losses
(Vandeveer and others, 1989). 
Institutional factors, sometimes unanticipated, such as
regulations or other policies, can prohibit or discourage
the use of some practices or equipment.  For example,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (USEPA)
pesticide registration process requires testing and
reviews to ensure a safe product, but may slow the
introduction of new materials.  Alternatively, regula-
tions on or policies to discourage currently used prac-
tices may encourage the adoption of new ones.  For
example, USEPA registers safer pesticides while
restricting or banning other materials with undesirable
environmental effects.  In addition, State University
Research and Extension programs can provide informa-
tion that helps growers change pest control practices. 
Input Substitution and
Environmental Implications
While risk management policies may have no direct
health or environmental effects, they can influence the
use of inputs and practices that do.  Key elements that
influence input use are output prices, input prices, and
marginal productivities of production factors, as well as
the yield or revenue risk effects of inputs. Many pro-
duction practices can generate environmental benefits:
a) reductions in pesticide, fertilizer, or irrigation use;
b) changes in cropping patterns to reduce soil erosion
and surface runoff; c) planting more-highly erodible
acres to soil-conserving crops; and d) increases in the
use of information and precision technologies.
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ticides or fertilizers, such as some crop rotations or
cultivation practices, can have environmental costs
such as increased soil erosion. Programs, policies, or
market factors that encourage the use of one or more
inputs could discourage the use of others and affect the
acreage and output of different commodities. No clear
consensus has emerged from empirical economic
research about the effects of risk management policies
(such as subsidized crop insurance), on crops grown,
input used, or other production practices.
Much of the economic literature implies that increas-
ing the use of one risk-reducing input discourages the
use of other risk-reducing inputs and encourages the
use of risk-increasing ones. The implications are that
risk-reducing inputs are substitutes for each other, as
are risk-increasing inputs, but that risk-reducing and
risk-increasing ones are complements for each other.
Some controversy remains about the risk effects of
using various inputs and how their use would respond
to risk management policies.  While much of the liter-
ature says that pesticide use and irrigation decrease
risk, and fertilizer use increases risk, some economic
research supports the opposite conclusions (Babcock
and Hennessy, 1996; Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993;
Leathers and Quiggen, 1991; Smith and Goodwin,
1996). However, several of these authors argue that
pesticide and fertilizer use reduce the probabilities of
low yields and indemnities, even if variance might
increase (Babcock and Hennessy, 1996; Smith and
Goodwin, 1996).
An important issue is how crop insurance might affect
the use of information and of pest, fertilizer, and irri-
gation management practices. There are a number of
arguments that information and crop insurance can
reduce fertilizer, pesticide, or irrigation water use
(Feder, 1979; Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993).
However, to the extent that information and manage-
ment practices substitute for crop insurance as risk-
reducing agents, encouraging crop insurance could dis-
courage their use (Norgaard, 1976). Conversely, if eco-
nomic incentives changed, increased use of crop rota-
tion, management practices, or information could
reduce purchases of crop insurance. None of the
empirical research reviewed indicates whether crop
insurance would necessarily have a greater or lesser
effect on per-acre use of pesticides than other pest
management practices.  Similarly, crop insurance
could discourage the use of management practices or
information that helps to reduce fertilizer or irrigation
water use.
However, Loehman and Nelson (1992) showed that an
increase in the use of one risk-reducing input does not
necessarily mean a decline in the use of another risk-
reducing input. They showed that two risk-reducing
inputs, two risk-increasing inputs, or a risk-reducing
and risk-increasing input could be risk substitutes or
complements. Inputs that are production substitutes
could potentially be risk substitutes, while production
complements could be risk complements, but marginal
profits and prices are also factors.  Based on their dis-
cussion, crop insurance purchases could encourage use
of pest monitoring or other information, crop rotations,
or other pesticide-free practices as complementary
components of systems to reduce pest losses more
risk-efficiently than scheduled, prophylactic pesticide
use.  Similarly, the results of Wu and Babcock (1998)
indicate that insurance and nitrogen testing could be
complementary in reducing risk, but it is unclear
whether soil testing would increase or decrease fertil-
izer application rates.
Pesticides, fertilizers, or irrigation could also be substi-
tutes or complements in their risk effects.  Irrigation or
fertilizers can increase the value of the crop to be pro-
tected or create conditions for pest losses in some situ-
ations and, thus, increase the value of pesticide use as
a damage- and risk-reducing agent.  Alternatively, irri-
gation or fertilizers can reduce the potential for pest
losses and the value of pesticide use by improving
plant vigor.  Pesticide use might improve yield
response to fertilizer or irrigation. 
Risk-management policies or the use of risk-reducing
inputs could encourage other extensive margin deci-
sions that increase risk.  Crop insurance, especially if
subsidized, and disaster payments may have encour-
aged increased planting of higher value crops that
increase the use of pesticides and fertilizer and may be
more prone to soil erosion. Those programs may have
also encouraged planting of such crops on less produc-
tive or more erodible acres (Gardner and Kramer,
1986; Wu, 1999; and Keeton, Skees, and Long, 1999). 
Some growers have decreased the use of crop rotations
that reduce pest populations, continuously planted
higher-value crops, and increased pesticide use to pre-
vent pest damage. For example, preplant methyl bro-
mide use encourages continuous double-cropping of
44  Risk, Government Programs, and the Environment/TB-1908 Economic Research Service/USDAhigh-value vegetable crops in Florida, continuous
strawberry cropping in California, and replanting of
orchards in California without several years of fallow.
Soil insecticides allow farmers to grow continuous
corn rather than rotating corn with soybeans or other
crops to control soil insects. 
Conceivably, the use of some inputs, crop diversifica-
tion, or crop insurance might encourage investment by
reducing yield or revenue risk, especially on high-value
crops, and increasing the risk-adjusted return on invest-
ment.  Therefore, subsidized crop insurance or disaster
payments could encourage investments, such as irriga-
tion equipment, to produce higher value crops that ulti-
mately rely on greater intensive margin input use.
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intensive-margin choices In the context of crop production, these choices concern the amount of a variable 
input used per acre.  In the traditional static framework, the optimal amount occurs
where marginal productivity equals input price.
extensive-margin choices In the traditional framework, land should be allocated to the use that generates the 
greatest return.  Land on the extensive margin is at the break-even point for pro-
duction, because it generates no rent when all variable inputs are optimally allocat-
ed.  If output prices increase, land rents increase, so that more acreage can be allo-
cated to crop production.
technology adoption Production takes place within the context of technology that defines what can be 
produced and how inputs are used in the production process.  Technology adoption
concerns choices of new outputs, production practices, and equipment.  Choices 
can vary from minor adjustments in the production process, such as a different pes-
ticide or seed variety, to major changes in final outputs produced and production 
process and large investments in new equipment.
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In this report, we have reviewed the agricultural eco-
nomics literature that examines the interactions of risk,
government programs, and the environment.  Because
this literature is so large, reviewing all of it is a daunt-
ing task; and because it is so divergent, no sweeping
paradigm exists to efficiently characterize it and put all
of it into perspective. 
Rather than review all research papers piecemeal, or
attempt to fashion a sweeping generalization, this
report breaks the overview into its constituent compo-
nents.  First, the report reviews the basic perfect-mar-
kets and imperfect-markets approaches to modeling
risk, illustrating each approach using a simple exam-
ple.  Next, it provides an overview of the government
programs that affect incentives via changes in both the
risk and return to production activities.  Finally, it
examines the nature of agricultural production deci-
sions, how these decisions affect risk and return, and
how they may lead to environmental damages.  
This report summarizes the basic modeling approaches
and the basic issues—the building blocks that make up
a more comprehensive view.  But it provides little in
the way of comprehensive analysis of all the compo-
nents together—risk, government programs, and the
environment.  These interactions are complex, and can
be woven together in many different ways. 
Figure 11 illustrates these complicated interactions
between risk, government programs, production deci-
sions, and the environment.  It shows how exogenous
factors (those determined outside the agricultural pro-
duction system), such as the weather, climate, popula-
tion, and so on, feed into endogenous choices and fac-
tors, such as the economic environment (perfect versus
imperfect markets), market mechanisms (private con-
tracts versus spot markets), and production choices.
The nature of production, in turn, determines environ-
mental consequences.  And the culmination of all these
factors collectively determines more traditional wel-
fare measures, such the amount produced, the cost of
production, the distribution of wealth, the smoothness
of consumption, and so on.   In order to draw conclu-
sions, every model must make simplifying assump-
tions about the structure of these components and their
interactions.
Some Conclusions
This review of risk, government programs, the envi-
ronment, and their interactions provides six main con-
clusions:
1) Risk effects are not synonymous with risk aver-
sion.  A large share of agricultural risk research 
uses the no-risk-sharing approach described in 
Chapter 3, an approach that assumes that all con-
sumption smoothing must take place via smooth
ing of income or profits.  Within this approach, 
risk effects are ultimately tied to farmers’ degree 
of risk aversion, usually characterized by a 
smoothly concave utility function.  In reality, mar-
kets do work to share risks, but do so imperfectly.
These imperfections imply that risk usually will
matter in ways it does not in perfect markets, but
not necessarily in a way that can be characterized
by a smooth, concave utility function.  From the
vantage of the contracting approach of Chapter 3,
it becomes clear that the way risk influences pro-
duction decisions depends mainly on the con-
straints imposed by asymmetric information, not
by individual preferences.  In the future,
researchers may want to apply the no-risk-sharing
approach sparingly and interpret results from this
approach judiciously (not as preferences, but as a
complicated amalgamation of preferences and
constraints on risk sharing).
2) The production consequences that stem from
imperfect risk sharing can be observationally
equivalent to information-related risk effects.  In
some instances, the predictions stemming from
information-related risk effects reviewed in
Chapter 2 will be observationally equivalent to
those of the imperfect risk-sharing approaches
reviewed in Chapter 3.  Our understanding about
the importance of risk would benefit from empir-
ical work that carefully disentangles one kind of
effect from the other.  One way of doing this is to
focus on the stochastic properties of the risks in
question. The end of Chapter 2 describes how the
transitory nature of yield shocks implies that they
Economic Research Service/USDA Risk, Government Programs, and the Environment/TB-1908  49
Perspectives50  Risk, Government Programs, and the Environment/TB-1908 Economic Research Service/USDA
Figure 11












































Wildland and Habitat Preservationshould have no effect in a perfect-markets world
but do matter when markets are imperfect, and
may therefore serve as an effective device to dif-
ferentiate these two kinds of effects.  The prob-
lem of observational equivalence is more acute
with price shocks, which persist over long time
horizons.
3) Static models overlook important longrun risks.
Longrun risks are the most difficult to insure and
may be important for understanding longrun deci-
sions, such as capital investment, technology
adoption, crop rotations, and tree plantings.
Because futures markets typically extend only
about 2 years, and because farmers cannot know
for certain what crops they will grow in the
future, no explicit longrun contingent claims
exist.  These longrun risks also appear to be
insured in part by the countercyclical nature of
government program payments. Moreover, these
longrun decisions tend to be large-scale and ulti-
mately drive intensive-margin input use, which
entail perhaps the most studied of environmental
consequences. Although longrun risks could be
the most interesting and salient of the risks that
interact with government programs and the envi-
ronment, they also will be the most challenging to
assess empirically.  Among other reasons, this
empirical task will be challenging because 
longrun risks are important via both the dynamic
uncertainty approach of Chapter 2 and the credit-
constraints approach of Chapter 3, two views of
risk that hold very different policy implications. 
4) Risk effects are difficult to identify and easy to
misidentify. To identify the effect of risk, one
needs data from different environments with dif-
ferent risks.  The problem is that risk is difficult
to measure objectively; and it is even more diffi-
cult to measure differences in risk over space and
time.  Furthermore, differences in risk, when they
can be identified, usually are closely associated
with other kinds of differences.  For example,
yields on irrigated acreage are less variable than
yields on nonirrigated acreage; but irrigation tech-
nology also may allow production of crops that
are incapable of being produced on nonirrigated
land; and irrigated lands may have systematically
different soils than nonirrigated land.  In general,
spatial differences in risks will be heavily con-
founded by climate, soil type, and other kinds of
physical heterogeneity.  And different individuals
(i.e., those with more or less risk aversion) may
be drawn to more or less risky farming regions.
Time-series variation in risk can be more difficult
to quantify than spatial differences.  Research on
agricultural risk could therefore benefit from a
more careful search for natural experiments—
exogenous sources of identification that are not
correlated with other uncontrolled factors.  One
compelling natural experiment, for example,
might be the precipitous increase in crop insur-
ance participation that occurred with the 1994
subsidy increases.  The construction and use of
improved panel data sets would allow researchers
to better control for many types of heterogeneity
that confound many empirical analyses.
5) Future research would benefit from a better
understanding and accounting of agro-environ-
mental links. Geographic heterogeneity is intrinsi-
cally confounded with risk, as noted in conclusion
4: different farms face different risks, in part
because different farms are located in areas with
different weather, climatic conditions, and soil
types.  The environmental consequences of agri-
cultural production decisions also depend on
weather, climatic conditions, and soil types.
Thus, to understand how risk influences the envi-
ronment via its effect on production decisions,
researchers need a greater understanding as to
how different agricultural production decisions
affect environmental quality in different locations.  
6) Future research would benefit from exploring the
practical relevance of experimental violations of
the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) for agricultur-
al production decisions.  The penultimate section
of Chapter 3 discussed certain psychological phe-
nomena, observed both in experiments and in
aggregate economic data, that contradict econo-
mists’ standard notion of risk aversion.
Economists’ standard notion of risk aversion
hinges on EUT and diminishing marginal utility
of consumption.  The evidence, however, suggests
that individuals display more risk aversion than
diminishing marginal utility can plausibly imply,
hold preferences for risk that are inconsistent with
their preferences for intertemporal substitution,
and, in economic experiments, violate the inde-
pendence axiom of EUT, among many other
anomalies.  There has been little application of
these findings to agricultural production, for
which risk remains a central feature.  Future work
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relevance of these psychological phenomena for
the microeconomic behavior of farm production
decisions under risk.
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